Workshop "The Secular, Secularizations, and Secularisms"

Berlin, June 7-10, 2006

CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON THE SECULAR

Secular, secularity, secularism, and secularisation

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Terms can be defined in different ways but in order to grasp their common meaning it helps to pay attention to actual usages. Grammar often indicates important cultural background decisions that go far beyond mere linguistic rules or norms. These decisions show in the semantic contrasts and pragmatic implications that determine the use of terms. In what follows I draw attention to only some of these.

1. Secularisation and sacralisation

In 1966 B. Wilson[1] defined secularisation as »the process whereby religious thinking, practices and institutions lose social significance«. Three points are important here:

1. The point of view from which the phenomenon is defined is the role of religion in a society: its social significance. This is *not* the point of view of practitioners of a religion but of social scientists.

2. This view involves two assumptions that need not be shared by adherents of a religion. The first is that there is a difference between religious and non-religious activities, practices and institutions within a society so that people lead religious or non-religious lives, as they case may be, rather than perform different religious activities or live different sorts of religious lives.

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[1] B. R. Wilson, *Religion in Secular Society. A Sociological Comment*, London 1966.

3.   The second is that there is a transition of (the significance of) things, goods, practices, institutions or ideas from religious to non-religious spheres. The change affects not necessarily their religious but their social significance.

However, from a religious point of view this is only interesting if (a) social significance is important to a religion (which is not the case with all religions or all strands in a religion); if (b) there are significant non-religious practices, institutions or ideas from a religious point of view so that changes are not merely shifts from one strand of religious life or mode of religious significance (religious rituals) to another (everyday life); and if (c) these changes are interpreted as a loss rather than a gain from a religious point of view (that is, if the end of religion is not seen in the very overcoming of the difference between religious and non-religious spheres of society by transforming it according to the ends of the religion in question).

At its most basic level the traditional view of secularisation assumes (a) a difference of social spheres of significance (or different degrees of social significance), (b) a difference between religious and the non-religious practices, institutions and ideas, and (c) a movement or change of something from the religious to the non-religious sphere. If the movement takes place in the opposite direction one can speak of *sacralisation*; if the difference between religious and non-religious spheres is denied, there can only be shifts *in* religious or non-religious (secular) significance but not from the one to the other; and if social significance does not come in degrees or if we concentrate only on events and not on things (in a broad sense), there is no change in time in either direction but only a different overall distribution of social significance in a society.

2. Descriptive and normative uses of ›secular‹

The term *secular* and related terms are used in both a *descriptive* and a *normative* sense, and this in different ways. The descriptive usages all draw on a fundamental contrast between *secular* and *nonsecular*. Whenever this contrast is used to evaluate one side

positively and the other negatively the terms acquire a normative sense. Two things are important here.

1. *Ambiguity between descriptive and normative usages*: Often it is not clear where and when the transition from a descriptive to a normative use occurs, and it is important to pay attention to this in reading accounts of the history of modernity in terms of ›a decline of religion and a rise of secularity‹.

2. *Ambiguity of normative use*: The normative use is ambiguous because the term(s) can be used in strictly opposite ways. Thus *secularism* is the position of those who evaluate the secular or secularity positively and whatever is opposed to it negatively; or it is used in the opposite sense by the non-secular as an invective for what they consider to be an a- or anti-religious ideology.

It is obvious that the normative import of these terms depends on whether they are used from a *secular* or a *non-secular* point of view, i.e. whether those who use them place themselves on the side of the *secular* (understood in a positive sense) or the *non-secular* (understood in a positive sense). The same facts and historical developments described as *secular* or *secularity* or *secularisation* are then evaluated positively or negatively, as the case may be; and the slip from a descriptive to a normative use results in a view of the history of modernity as progress or as decline.

3. Basic and derivative contrasts

The term *secular* indicates different contrasts depending on how the *non-secular* is construed. From a systematic point of view the following contrasts have been particularly important in the history of the West:

a. Divine vs. secular (vertical or D-secularity):

Here the basic idea is that there is a fundamental contrast between God and the world. The world is created but not divine. Nothing in the world is to be confused with God.

(1)   The »disenchantment of the world« begins where two intellectual moves occur: a change from polytheism to monotheism *and* the understanding of God's relation to the world as creation and not as emanation or participation. Monotheism as such is not enough to account for this development as the Hellenist religions show. What is decisive is the distinction between (one) *creator* and (one) *creation*.

(2)   Corollaries of this view are a series of further distinctions in describing the world, in particular those between

   a)   *God* and *idols*: *God* is in no way to be likened to or confused with creation. Conversely whenever something created is divinized, it becomes idolized.

   b)   *Faith* and *superstition*: *Faith* is directed towards God the creator; when it is misdirected to something created it becomes *superstition*.

These are not descriptive but evaluative distinctions made from the point of view of those who (believe to) have faith in God and not merely belief in idols.

b. Religious vs. secular (horizontal or R-secularity):

Within the created world there is a contrast between two (in the D-sense of the term) ›secular‹ realms of human life and activity: those intentionally directed and addressed to God, and those directed towards created reality. This contrast can be understood and interpreted in different ways. To mention just some of the most prominent ones:

(1)   In a local sense (and its metaphorical extensions) it is the contrast between **holy/ profane**, i.e. that which belongs to the sphere of the divine (e.g. the temple), or to whatever lies outside this sphere or area. It was this distinction which was denied and rejected by D-secularity, and to restate it under these different conditions changes its point: *Holy* is only what is *made holy* by God, and not what humans determine or delineate as holy; and to perform a *holy practice* or live in a *holy area* is no less secular (in the D-sense of the term) than any other worldly activity. Conversely, profane activities (such as performing one's professional duties) can

acquire an added religious value and holy activities (such as giving offerings to the emperor) become an unacceptable offence against true faith in the only true God.

(2)   In an institutional sense it is the contrast between **ecclesial/political,** i.e. that which refers to the church or, on the other hand, to the political order. Since both orders are manifest in particular institutions (Pope/Emperor; clerical orders/political administrators), the ecclesial comes to be seen as a social institution alongside other institutions of society. To perform ecclesial functions is to perform a religious function within society. Thus the difference between the ecclesial and political realms and activities is a *differentiation within society*.

This distinction cannot be made from a neutral point of view but only from either an ecclesial or non-ecclesial or, conversely, a political or non-political perspective.

c. Religious differentiations between religious/secular (religious R-secularity):

From an ecclesial or non-political perspective it can be stated

(3)   as a contrast between **clerical/secular,** i.e. ecclesial activities that relate to the life of the church, and other activities of other institutions within society. This is the same contrast as (2) but made from the *point of view of the church* rather than from that of society at large.

(4)   Similarly, in a monastic sense it can be stated as a contrast between **monastic/ secular.** This contrast is made with respect to the role and function of clergy and differentiates between the monastic life of religious clergy and the non-monastic life of secular clergy. This distinction is drawn from the point of view of a particular group or institution within the church (monks, monastic clergy). It illustrates how the external distinction between church and (the rest of) society is internally re-produced in a series of similar distinctions with respect to functions and activities of particular church bodies or agents.

(5)   In a functional sense it occurs as the contrast between **church/secular society.** This distinction applies, among other things, to works of art produced for religious or

non-religious purposes. For example, so-called ›secular sonatas‹ in the 17th century were composed not for church services but for private or social musical entertainment.

d. Secular differentiations between religious/secular (secular R-secularity):

(6)   In a political sense the contrast is stated as that between **confessional/secular.** This contrast becomes established with the rise of secular nation states and governments in the wake of the religious wars in Europe, and it is used to link or parallel a number of independent developments, namely

   a)   the move from confessional strife to secular peace (political motive: 16th/17th century),

   b)   the move from monopolist state economy to free market economy (economic motive: 18th/19th century)

   c)   the move from authoritarian religious past to a liberal modernity (cultural motive: 19th/20th century).

In the light of each of these changes the religious is construed with a different emphasis and in a different sense. From the perspective of (a.) it is held that secular political powers must not interfere in religious affairs (›religion is private‹). From the perspective of (b.) a plurality of confessions, denominations or religions are allowed to coexist within nation states (›religion is plural‹; ›religion exists only in religions‹). From the perspective of (c.) only what is defensible according to public standards of neutral and universal reason can be taken seriously (›religious belief is pre-scientific and cannot be held rationally‹). Where these different views of religion as *private*, *plural* and *pre-rational* are combined, views of secularity are turned into *secularism*.

4. From secularity to secularism and back

In this latter sense *secularism* becomes a key word for modernity, not merely in a descriptive but also a normative sense. It both respects it can be used in different and even opposite ways, and in both these ways it is often confused with *secularization*.

a. Levels of description

C.J. Sommerville (1998)[2] has distinguished the following levels of description for the use of the term ›secularisation‹:

1.   At the level of macro social structures, secularization refers to *differentiation*: a process in which the various aspects of society, economic, political, legal, and moral, become increasingly discrete in relation to each other.

2.   At the level of individual institutions, secularization refers to the *transformation* of a religious into a secular institution.

3.   At the level of activities, secularization refers to the *transfer of activities from religious to secular institutions*. In most Western countries, government, the not-for-profit sector and the private sector have taken over the provision of social welfare functions.

4.   When discussing mentalities, secularization refers to the *transition* from *ultimate* concerns to *proximate* concerns.

5.   When discussing populations, secularization refers to broad patterns of societal *decline in levels of religiosity* as opposed to the individual-level secularization of 4.

These different levels of descriptions do not necessarily cohere or imply each other. Therefore to use the term without specifying its reference and the level of description is bound to create confusion. This the more so since the term is often used in all these respects without distinguishing it from *secularism*.

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[2] »Secular Society, Religious Population: Our Tacit Rules for using the Term Secularisation«, *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion 37* (1998) 249-53.

b. Secularism in a positive sense

Where secularism is used in a positive sense it often combines the following aspects:

1. In a political sense it insists on the idea that religion should not interfere with or be integrated into the public affairs of society.

2. In institutional terms it insists on a separation of state and church (political and religious institutions and organisations), whether in the sense of the strict independence in the USA or of the anticlerical laïcité in France.

3. In an ideological sense it rejects religious belief as a key to understanding the world, insists on an unbridgeable gap between reason and religion and assigns all religious views and orientations to an outdated pre-rational past.

Construed in this complex sense, secularism becomes an ideology.

c. Secularism in a negative sense

This can be re jected without, however, denying the identification of secularism and modernity. For example, in recent years Radical Orthodoxy has criticized secularism as a modernist ideology. It has dominated Western culture since the Age of Enlightenment in Europe but its roots can be traced back to Scotism and its far-reaching impact on Western culture. Scotism misled Western thinking in general and theology in particular to break away from the world-view of the Fathers and in particular Augustine; it furthered the tendency to replace a realist outlook on the world by a confused nominalism; it propagated a misleading doctrine of a unitary idea of being of God and world; it defended a view of authority as centred in the people rather than in God; and it resulted in a problematic marginalisation of theology in the academic institutions of the West. It is easy to see how Radical Orthodoxy turns the tables on secularism by using the same pattern of sweeping argument and generalisation from a non-secular or religious rather than a secular perspective.

d. Varieties of fundamentalism

This is the pattern of argument of many religious reactions to modernity and of most fundamentalist rejections of modernism and secularism. They all have in common (a.) that they take their stand in the anti-secular camp of the religious/secular contrast and (b.) dissolve the difference between D-secularity and R-secularity, i.e. identify whatever religious point of view they propagate with God's point of view. Put differently,

1.   they accept the modern contrast between religious and secular perspectives;

2.   they place themselves in the opposite camp of the secular, i.e. in the non-secular or anti-secular camp as defined from the secular perspective; and

3.   they identify the religious perspective with the divine point of view.

However, this is to ignore a number of important ›reversals‹ of points of view in the history of the West:

1.   It is one thing to define the secular from a classical religious point of view (religious focus) as *that which is not religious* (as classical Christianity did), quite another to define the religious from a secular point of view (non-religious focus) as *that which is not secular*.

2.   Similarly, it is one thing to reject the non-religious (secular) view of religion as *that which is not secular* from a (classical) religious point of view (religious focus), quite another to do so from a non-secular point of view (non-religious focus). In the latter case modern secularism is attacked from precisely the point of view which it has created by excluding it normatively as pre-modern and non-secular.

3.   This is exactly what fundamentalism does: It reacts to modern normative secularism in its own terms, and in doing so it turns the religion it defends into an anti-ideology to a modern secularist ideology. However, it is a mistake to believe that denying secularism is a way of returning to what has been denied by secularism. Fundamentalism is not a return to religion as it was before it had been marginalised by modern secularism but rather a protest of the marginalized against modernity in modernity's own terms.

What goes wrong here, from a theological point of view, is a misconstrual of one's own position:

Instead of noticing that D-secularity *dissolves* the distinction between *divine* and *secular* as a distinction within creation so that all intra-mundane differences between *secular* and *religious* in whatever terms are placed on the side of the secular rather than the divine, it seeks to elevate the mundane contrast into a dominance of the religious over the secular by identifying the religious (in whatever sense of the R-contrast) with the divine (in the sense of the D-contrast). It thus falls prey to precisely the religious criticism that replaced an enchanted world by a creation that is not in any sense, not even in parts or aspects, to be identified with the divine.

The Secular

Charles Taylor

We live in a world in which ideas, institutions, art styles, and formulae for production and living, circulate among societies and civilizations which are very different in their historical roots and traditional forms. Parliamentary democracy spread outward from England, among other countries, to India. And the practice of non-violent civil disobedience spread from its origins in Gandhi's practice, to many other places, including Martin Luther King's civil rights movements, to Manila in 1983, and eventually to the velvet and orange revolutions of our time.

But these ideas and forms don't just change place as solid blocks; they are also modified, reinterpreted, given a new spin and meaning in each transfer. This can lead to tremendous confusion when we try to follow these shifts and understand them. One possible course of confusion comes from taking the word too seriously: the name may be the same, but the reality will often be different.

This is evident in the world "secular". We think of "secularization" as a process that can occur anywhere (and for some people, is occurring everywhere). And we think of secularist régimes as options for any country, whether they are adopted or not. And certainly, these **words** crop up everywhere. But do they really mean the same thing? Are there not, rather, subtle differences, which can bedevil cross-cultural discussions of these matters?

I think there are, and that they do make problems for our understanding. Either we stumble through cross-purposes. Or else, a rather minimal awareness of the differences can lead us to draw far-reaching conclusions which are very wrong. As when people argue that since the "secular" is an old category of Christian culture, and since Islam doesn't seem to have a corresponding category, including such notions as distinction of Church and State, THEREFORE, Islamic societies cannot adopt secular regimes. Obviously, they will not be just like those in Christendom, but maybe the idea here can travel in a more inventive and imaginative way.

Let's look at some of the features of the "secular" as a category developed within Latin Christendom. First, it was one term of a dyad. The secular had to do with the "century", that is, with profane time; and contrasted with what related to the eternal, or higher time. Certain times, places, persons, institutions, actions were seen as closely related to the sacred or higher time, and others as out there in profane time. That's why the same distinction could often be made by use of the dyad "spiritual/ temporal" (e.g., the state as the "temporal arm"). Ordinary parish priests are "secular" priests, because they operate out there in the "century", as against in monastic institutions under rules (the "regular" priests).

So there was an obvious meaning for "secularization", which goes pretty far back – to the aftermath of the Reformation. When certain functions, properties, institutions were transferred out of church control to those of laymen, this was "secularization".

These moves were originally made within a system in which the dyad held; things were moved from one niche to another within a standing system of niches. This feature, where it still holds, can make secularization a relatively undramatic affair, a re-arrangement of the furniture in a civilization whose basic features remain unchanged.

But from the 17th Century on, a new possibility arose. A new conception of social life came gradually to be defined in which the "secular" was all there was. Since "secular" originally applied to a kind of time, profane or ordinary time, seen in relation to higher times, what was necessary was to come to understand profane time as all there is; to deny any relation to higher time. The word could go on being used, but the meaning was profoundly changed, because what it contrasted with was quite altered. The contrast was not another time-dimension, in which "spiritual" institutions found their niche; rather the secular was in the new sense opposed to claims on resources or allegiance made in the name of something transcendent to this world and its interests. Needless to say, those who imagined a "secular" world in this sense saw these claims as ultimately unfounded, and only to be tolerated to the extent that they didn't challenge the interests of worldly power and well-being.

Because many people went on believing in the transcendent, it could even be necessary that churches continue to have their place. They could in their own way be essential to the well-functioning of society. But this good function was to be understood in terms of "this worldly" goals and values (peace, prosperity, growth, flourishing, etc.)

Needless to say, this way of putting things depends on a clear distinction being made between "this world", or the immanent, and the transcendent. This very clear-cut distinction is itself a product of the development of Latin Christendom, and has become part of our way of seeing things in the West. We tend to apply it universally, even though nothing this hard and fast exists in any other human culture in history. What does seem indeed, to exist universally is some distinction between higher beings, or spirits, or realms, and the everyday one we see immediately around us. But these are not usually sorted out into two distinct realms, where the lower one can be taken as a system understandable purely in its own terms. Rather, the levels usually interpenetrate, so that the lower can't be understood without the higher. To take an example from the realm of philosophy, for Plato, the existence and development of the things around us can only be understood in terms of the corresponding Ideas, and these exist in a realm outside time. The clear separation of an immanent from a transcendent order is one of the inventions (for better or worse) of Latin Christendom.

The new understanding of the secular I have just been describing builds on this clear separation. It affirms, in effect, that the "lower", immanent or secular order is all there is; that the higher, or transcendent is a human invention. Obviously, the prior invention of the clear-cut distinction between the levels prepared the ground for this "declaration of independence" of the immanent.

The first unambiguous assertion of this self-sufficiency of the secular came with the radical phases of the French Revolution; although there were ambiguous regimes in the century which preceded it; like the attempts of "Enlightened" rulers, such as Frederick the Great and Joseph II to "rationalize" religious institutions, in effect treating the Church as a department of the state.

This polemic assertion of the secular returns in the Third Republic, whose "laïcité" is founded on these ideas of self-sufficiency and the exclusion of religion. Marcel Gauchet shows how Renouvier laid the grounds for the outlook of the Third Republic radicals in their battle against the church. The state has to be « moral et enseignant ». It has « charge d'âmes aussi bien que toute Église ou communauté, mais à titre plus universel. » Morality is the key criterion. In order not to be under the church, the state must have « une morale indépendante de toute religion", and enjoy a "suprématie morale" in relation to all religions. The basis of this morality is liberty. In order to hold its own before religion the morality underlying the state has to be based on more than just utility or feeling; it needs a real "théologie rationnelle", like that of Kant.[3]

Needless to say, this spirit goes marching on in contemporary France, as one can see in the discussion about banning the Muslim headscarf. The insistence is still that the public spaces in which citizens meet must be purified of any religious reference.

And so the history of this term "secular" in the West is complex and ambiguous. It starts off as a term in a dyad, which distinguishes two dimensions of existence, identifying them by the kind of time which is essential to each. But then building on the clear immanent/transcendent distinction, it mutates into a term in another dyad, where "secular" refers to what pertains to a self-sufficient immanent sphere, and its contrast term (often identified as "religious") relates to the transcendent realm. This can then mutate, via a denial of this transcendent level, into a dyad in which one term refers to the real (the secular), and the other to what is merely invented (the religious); or where "secular" refers to the institutions we really require to live in "this world", and "religious" or "ecclesial" to optional extras which often disturb the course of this-worldly life.

The dyad itself has thus profoundly changed; in the first case, both sides are real and indispensable dimensions of life and society. After the mutation, secular and religious are opposed as true/false, or necessary/superfluous.

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[3] Marcel Gauchet, *La Religion dans la Démocratie*, Paris : Gallimard 1998, pp. 47-50

Then this term, with all its baggage of ambiguity, and its depth assumptions of a clear immanent/transcendent distinction, begins to travel. No wonder it causes immense confusion. Westerners are themselves frequently confused about their own history. But a common view embraces the true/false view, but sees the earlier two-dimensions view as having created the necessary historical pre-conditions for its arising. One way of stating this is to understand western secularism as the separation of religion and state, the excision of religion into a "private" zone where it can't interfere with the common life. Then the earlier western distinction between church and state, which eventually led to a separation of church and state, is seen as the run up to the finally satisfactory solution, where religion is finally hived off.

But these stages are not clearly distinguished. Thus American secularists often confuse totally separation of Church and State from that of religion and state. Rawls at one point wanted to ban all reference to the grounds of people's "comprehensive views" (these included religious views) from public discourse.

And this leads to disastrously ethnocentric judgments. If the canonical background for a satisfactory secularist regime is the three-stage history: distinction church/state, then separation church/state, then sidelining of religion from state and public life; then obviously Islamic societies can never make it.

Or again, one often hears the judgment that Chinese imperial society was already "secular"; totally ignoring the tremendous role played by the immanent / transcendent split in the Western concept, a split which had no analogue in traditional China.

What to do? It's too late to ban the word "secular"; too many controversies have already been started in these terms. But "secularism", as an essential feature of religiously diverse societies, aiming to secure freedom of both belief and unbelief, as well as equality between citizens, is much too important a matter to be left to "secularists", by which I mean those who are deeply into the true/false dyad arising out of the history of

Latin Christendom. (I apologize to Clémenceau for parodying his famous dictum on war.)

We need to take a deep breath, and start again, at another point. Here I take a leaf from the book of Rajeev Bhargava, thinking about the Indian context.[4] We need to articulate afresh the basic goals which we seek in secularist régimes, including those of freedom and equality I mentioned above. People can relate to those coming out of very different religious traditions. And they can devise ways of securing them which make sense in very different religious environments. Let us tune out the mantras chanted in certain Western societies with self-endowed vocations to universal validity, like "separation of Church and state", or "laïcité", and look at our real situations in the light of the indispensable values of democratic society.

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[4] Rajeev Bhargava,

Rethinking Processes of Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective

José Casanova

Over a decade ago, I suggested that in order to speak meaningfully of "secularization" we needed to distinguish three different connotations:

1) Secularization, as **decline of religious beliefs and practices** in modern societies, often postulated as the end point of a human universal developmental process. This is the most recent but by now the most widespread usage of the term in contemporary academic debates on secularization.

2) Secularization, as **privatization of religion**, often understood both as a general modern historical trend and as a normative condition, indeed as a precondition for modern liberal democratic politics.

3) Secularization, as **differentiation of the secular spheres** (state, economy, science), usually understood as "emancipation," from religious institutions and norms. This is the core component of the classic theories of secularization. It refers to the transfer of persons, things, meanings, etc., from ecclesiastical or religious to civil or lay use, possession or control.

Maintaining this analytical distinction, I argued, should allow to examine and to test the validity of each of the three propositions independently of each other and thus to refocus the often fruitless secularization debate into comparative historical analysis that could account for different patterns of secularization, in all three meanings of the term, across societies and civilizations.

While the decline and privatization theses have undergone numerous critiques and revisions in the last fifteen years, the understanding of secularization as a single developmental process of functional differentiation of the various institutional spheres or sub-systems of modern societies remains relatively uncontested in sociological theories of modernity, particularly within European sociology. In my previous work I myself had left the tesis of secular differentiation untouched as the still defensible core of the theory of secularization. But I am now convinced of the need to challenge also the thesis of

secular differentiation and to contribute to a revisionist reformulation under the heading of multiple differentiations, multiple secularizations, multiple modernities.

I've been led into the new revisionist thinking from three directions. Firstly, Talal Asad's critique showed that the thesis of de-privatization of religion I was defending had to have repercussions for the thesis of secular differentiation. Secondly, I've become increasingly unsatisfied with theories of global religious fundamentalism, which I find analytically fruitless, insofar as they rely on a previous global process of secular differentiation to which religious fundamentalism is supposed to be an anti-modern reaction. Finally, my attempts to expand the analysis of de-privatization of religion to the world of Islam have made me increasingly aware aware of the need to contextualize and historicize our categories for comparative civilizational analysis.

The reformulation of the thesis of secular differentiation should begin with a recognition of the particular Christian historicity of Western European developments as well as of the multiple and diverse historical patterns of secularization and differentiation within European and Western societies. Such a recognition in turn should allow a less Euro-centric comparative analysis of patterns of differentiation and secularization in other civilizations and world religions; and more importantly the further recognition that with the world-historical process of globalization initiated by the European colonial expansion, all these processes everywhere are dynamically interrelated and mutually constituted.

Concerning the Christian historicity of Western European developments:

- The historical patterns of secularization in Western Europe are themselves somehow related to internal dynamics of institutionalization and transformation of Western European Christianity. At the very least, one must recognize, that the category of the *saeculum* itself is a medieval Christian theological category, which itself served to structure the discourse and the institutional dynamics of European medieval Christendom first and of European secularization later.

- Such dynamics only became institutionalized in the 11th century with the "papal revolution." It is a dynamic intrinsic, therefore, to Latin but not to Eastern Orthodox Christendom. Thus, it is not a dynamic intrinsic to Christianity as a religion, or to the

Judeo-Christian tradition, whatever this may mean, or to some Judeo-Christian-Graeco-Roman synthesis, since one cannot find such a dynamic in older Eastern forms of Christianity (Alexandrian, Antiochean, Byzantine, etc).

- Internally the dissolution of the system of Medieval Christendom associated both with the Protestant Reformation and with the emergence of the European system of sovereign territorial states served to open up new multiple and diverse patterns of secularization across Western Europe. There are multiple and diverse secularizations in the West and multiple and diverse Western modernities and those are still mostly associated with fundamental historical differences between Catholic, Protestant and Byzantine Christianity, and between Lutheran and Calvinist Protestantism.

- If the European concept of secularization is not a particularly relevant category for the "Christian" United States, precisely because the United States never had a territorial church from which either state or society needed to be disestablished, much less may the concept be directly applicable to other axial civilizations with very different modes of structuration of the religious and the secular. As an analytical conceptualization of a historical process, secularization is a category that makes sense within the context of the particular internal and external dynamics of the transformation of Western European Christianity from the Middle Ages to the present. But the category becomes problematic once it is generalized as a universal process of societal development and once it is transferred to other world religions and other civilizational areas with very different dynamics of structuration of the relations and tensions between religion and world, or between cosmological transcendence and worldly immanence.

The category of secularization could hardly be applicable, for instance, to such 'religions' as Confucianism or Taoism, insofar as they are not characterized by high tension with 'the world,' insofar as their model of transcendence can hardly be called "religious," and insofar as they have no ecclesiastical organization. In a sense those religions which have always been 'worldly' and 'lay' do not need to undergo a process of secularization. To secularize, i.e., 'to make worldly' or 'to transfer from ecclesiastical to civil use', are processes that do not make much sense in such a civilizational context. In a certain sense, China and the Confucian civilizational area have been "secular" *avant la*

lettre. But this fact does not necessarily make Confucian civilization more modern. It is the intrinsic correlation between modernization and secularization, postulated by theories of functional differentiation, which is highly problematic.

It just happened, of course, that the particular, specifically Christian, and rather exceptional Western European dynamic of secularization became globalized with the expansion of European colonialism, with the global expansion of capitalism, with the global expansion of the European system of states, with the global expansion of modern science, modern culture and modern ideologies of secularism. Therefore, to ask how Confucianism, Taoism or any other world religion respond to the global expansion of "Western secular modernity", how religious traditions are reinterpreted as a response to this global challenge, to examine which kinds of *aggiornamentos* emerge within all world religions, using here the particular name given to the recent reinterpretation of the Catholic tradition, these are all valid an important questions. But to view all these diverse processes of religious transformation in a simple dichotomous way as either accommodation to secular modernity or as fundamentalist reaction against secularization is not, I would argue, a very fruitful or insightful way of interpreting these processes.

All world religions are forced to respond to the global expansion of modernity by reformulating their traditions in an attempt to fashion their own particular civilizational versions of modernity. Moreover, they are responding not only to the global challenge of secular modernity, but also to their mutual and reciprocal challenges, as they all undergo multiple processes of aggiornamento and come to compete with one another in the emerging global system of religions. Under conditions of globalization, the world religions do not only draw upon their own traditions but also increasingly upon one another. Intercivilizational encounters, cultural imitations and borrowings, diasporic diffusions, hybridity, creolization, and transcultural hyphenations are all part and parcel of the global present.

Religion in the Age of Contingency

Hans Joas

My interest in this book project is twofold. I am interested in overcoming the thesis that secularization (in the sense of a decline of religion) is a necessary corollary of modernization for two reasons: 1. a new view of the conditions for religious faith in our time; 2. a serious revision of theories of modernization.

As has frequently been observed, secularization theory never offered a well-worked out causal model as to which features of modernization allegedly lead to secularization. I argue that one can detect in the writings of the proponents of the secularization thesis three different types of a misguided understanding of religious faith.

a, Some have a cognitivist (mis-)understanding of religion. If religion is considered an uncertain or immature form of knowledge, it is evident that scientic progress and intellectual "enlightenment" must make religion superfluous. – To criticize this approach, one has to make clear why such a cognitivist understanding is wrong; the fundamental dimension of faith (and of the etymology of related concepts) is trust, love etc., not knowledge.

b, Some consider religion to be the expression of miserable conditions (poverty, inequality) or of bad living-conditions or of a lack of meaning that can be experienced as inherent in everyday life. In the perspective of Marxists, therefore, religion will become unnecessary in socialism/communism; in the perspective of medical materialists, increasing life-expectancy or better health make religion superfluous. These views (including the recent "existential security" hypothesis by Inglehart and Norris) underestimate the "enthusiastic" foundations of value commitments and the "sensitizing consequences" of religious attitudes that cannot be reduced to the consequences of the experience of contingency.

c, Some (like Peter Berger) assume that religion is best transmitted from generation to generation by authoritarian structures and under conditions of cultural homogeneity. Democratization, particularly democratic education, and cultural

pluralization would then lead to secularization. As I have argued in a chapter of an earlier book, this "contamination" thesis can empirically be falsified.

All three implicit assumptions are in serious need of revision. They cannot be the basis for the secularization thesis; an alternative understanding of the universality of experiences of self-transcendence and the specificities of a religious interpretation of this experience is necessary and can lead to an appreciation of modern conditions of high contingency in their effects on religious life.

2. The revision of the secularization thesis has to be based also on a global-comparative view on the connections between secularization and modernization. Here I claim that neither the European exceptions nor the American case can be explained by means of secularization theory. In a global perspective we see the religious effects of European (and North American) expansion and the effects of technological innovations on non-European religion. A wide range of different religious consequences and reactions can be described for which it is difficult to find a common denominator, but it is certain that secularization would not be the right term to characterize these reactions.

The consequences of this view for theories of modernity and modernization are profound. I consider a totalistic notion of modernity a "social myth" that "unifies many-sided social processes and phenomena into a single grand object" (B. Yack). I attempt to reverse this act of unification. I argue that there is no such thing as one unitary process of modernization with several tightly coupled subprocesses. We should rather assume several processes that are relatively independent from each other, though by no means causally unrelated. We can then examine the extent to which they are related, their respective temporal structures, the fields of tension and the problems of integration between them. This "deconstruction" of the notions of modernization and modernity is only the first step toward a fully action-theoretical reconstruction of these processes. The second step refers to an increase in individual options and a growing awareness of the non-determinist character of historical developments – and to an interplay of these processes. For all these matters the category of contingency is crucial.

The Consequences of Modernity on Religion: An Ambivalent Relationship?

Detlef Pollack

This paper focuses on the consequences processes of modernization are likely to have on the religious field. By raising this question, I assume that the categories we use for our comparative civilizational analysis are, and have to be, universally applicable, otherwise we will not be able to utilize such terms as modernization, modernity, or modern. Even if we concede that there are different types of modernity, multiple modernities, and different paths to modernity, we need a universally applicable term of modernity in order to be able to distinguish what is modern from what is not. Only if we have universally applicable categories can we compare different types of modernity, can we find out what is more or less modern, and can we distinguish between what belongs to modernity and what does not.

I propose to define modernization by five interrelated, but analytically distinctive processes: the process of raising the level of prosperity, the process of functional differentiation, the process of individualization, the process of political, economic and cultural pluralization and the process of widening the cognitive horizons. If I am interested in the consequences modernization has on religion, I have to analyze the impact of each of these five distinctive processes on the religious field.

On a theoretical level, these consequences can be rather ambivalent: they can tend to facilitate or inhibit religious vitality. None of the current proponents of the secularization theory assumes that modernization has a deterministic influence on religion and that secularization is a necessary corollary of modernization. Steve Bruce says, "nothing in the social world is inevitable or irreversable", and Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart speak of a probabilistic correlation between modernization and secularization instead of a deterministic one. I want to go a step further and maintain that theoretically, modernization can have a promoting as well as a demoting influence on the vitality of religion and that the impact modernization really has, becomes a question of empirical research. Thus by analyzing the various influences modernization might have on religion, I will develop in each of the five cases mentioned above two contradictory hypotheses, a

positive and a negative one, displaying the ambivalent character of the relationship between modernity and religion.

1) Raising the level of prosperity

There can be no doubt that processes of modernization lead to higher standards of living, better nutrition, sanitation, and access to clean water. More developed societies also usually have a better medical system, better hospitals, trained healthcare professionals, a better welfare safety net, health insurances, pensions, and a better protection against external threats like war and military raids.

In accordance with Norris and Inglehart, hypothesis 1a states that the less the vulnerability to risks like poverty, hunger, sickness, war, violations of human rights, or social demotion, the less the demand for religious forms of mastering contingency and ensuring security. If people have a higher degree of control over their social and natural environment, they don't need so much protection from transcendent powers.

Hypothesis 1b, however, contends that to the extent that material and existential security is guaranteed and survival can be taken for granted the individual interests shift from material to postmaterial values. If the economic conditions of survival are secured, people become more likely to turn to questions surrounding the meaning of life, self-realization, well-being, life quality, and questions of the foundation of religious meaning, too.

2) Functional differentiation

Functional differentiation which is regarded by many sociologists as one of the main features of modern societies means the unleashing of societal spheres from the dominance of religious institutions and interpretations. In the process of functional differentiation societal spheres like the economy, law, science, politics, medicine, art, and religion become more and more autonomous, following their individual codes and specializing on their individual functions. They can no longer be centrally steered, controlled, or even interpreted.

Hypothesis 2a: For religion, the process of functional differentiation can lead to the consequence that the opportunities to permeate other societal spheres and to influence them are reduced, that the possibilities of providing the society with a common interpretation of the world are weakened, and that the individual in his or her life conduct can less rely on religious support in the various non-religious life spheres (Luhmann, Dobbelaere). Capitalist market, scientific research, and democratric procedures have become almost entirely unsusceptible to religious and moral regulations. Insofar the impact religion has on non-religious spheres on the societal and the individual level might be diminished.

Hypothesis 2b: Processes of functional differentiation, however, can also strengthen the functional autonomy of the religious sphere as they do the economic or political sphere. Under conditions of functional differentiation, the likeliness of the interference of non-religious actors in the realm of religion is increasingly minimized and state and church are becoming more strictly seperated. The caesaro-papist embrace of throne and altar has probably "more than anything else determined the decline of church religion in Europe" (Casanova). It might be that churches and religious communities profit from a stricter seperation from other spheres. Whether a person achieves salvation no longer depends upon whether or not he is a good citizen. Insofar functional differentiation can also provide new opportunities for religious commitment not contaminated by non-religious, for example, political interests.

3) Individualization

In modern societies, actions and attitudes of the individual are determined by belonging to a certain class or milieu to a lesser degree than in pre-modern societies. Each person's biography is more and more removed from given determinations and more and more placed in his or her own hands, open and dependent on individual decisions. "The proportion of life opportunities which are fundamentally closed to decision-making is decreasing and the proportion of the biography which is open and must be constructed personally is increasing." (Ulrich Beck)

Hypothesis 3a: If the individual becomes increasingly responsible for his actions and attitudes, his religious practices and convictions are less and less shared by other individuals and therefore less and less supported by them. They loose their being taken for granted and become more insecure and reflexive. It is very likely that the individualization of religious decisions is thus accompanied by a lesser degree of religious certitude.

Hypothesis 3b: The decreasing influence class, status, milieu, neighborhood, and social origin have on one's individual fate can, however, also open up new opportunities for the development of highly individualized religious virtuosity. Now, religiosity and religious commitment need not to be conventional any more, but can become self-accountable. With some exaggeration, one could claim that only under modern conditions does religiosity cease to be a convention and has the chance to become an individual belief. That's why it does not come as a surprise that sociologists of religion such as Grace Davie conceive conventional church adherence and individual religiosity as an inverse relationship: The more people defect from church, the more they turn to extra-ecclesiastical spirituality.

4) Pluralization

Modern societies are characterized by a higher degree of pluralism and competition in the realms of politics, economy, science, and culture than pre-modern societies. Pluralism and competition do not necessarily belong together, but usually higher degrees of pluralism are correlated with higher degrees of competition.

Hypothesis 4a: High degrees of pluralism in the religious field usually lead to mutual relativizations of the religious claims on validity made by different religious communities. If a religious world-interpretation is confronted by a different religious world-interpretation, it will loose its being taken for granted. This challenge will lead to a higher degree of religious tolerance, and with the development of religious tolerance religious vigor will be weakened (Bruce).

Hypothesis 4b: In turn, the higher degree of religious pluralism and competition can be regarded as engendering higher levels of religious vitality (Stark, Iannaccone, Finke). If there are various religious groups competing with each other, the single suppliers feel challenged to be responsive to the needs of their customers, to attract new members and to retain their old members. A religious monopoly, however, makes the clergy lazy and indolent. Also, if there is religious diversity the consumer can choose between different offers and if he becomes dissatisfied with one product, he can select another one. Thus, religious pluralism is conducive to religious vitality.

5) Widening of the social horizon

Processes of modernization bring about an enormous widening of what is societally available and controllable. By including the formerly inaccessible into the realm of what is societally available and controllable, the societal horizons are widened and what used to be out of reach of society now becomes part of its perceptions and actions. Because of the steady widening of our horizons, our knowledge is permanently revised, examined, and reformed. Thus the former equation of knowledge with certitude is dissolved (Giddens). Modern knowledge inevitably is characterized by reflexivity.

Hypothesis 5a: On the one side the widening of the horizons and the reflexivity of modern knowledge render religious forms which are supposed to deal with the contingency of reality more contingent themselves. It is very likely that the awareness of the contingency of religious forms limits their plausibility and initiates the more concrete, illustrative and plastic religious forms to become more abstract, and vage.

Hypothesis 5b: On the other side the widening of the horizons and the reflexivity of modern knowledge increase the demand for clear orientations, ultimate answers, and distinct guidelines. With the intricateness of modern society, the need for religious orientations and fundamental truths rises.

On the theoretical level, it is conceivable that modernization has various, ambivalent, and even contradictory consequences for the stability and vitality of religion. Therefore, we

must shift the focus of our analysis from the theoretical level to the level of empirical research, in order to find out what the real consequences of modernity on the religious field are.

Aziz Al-Azmeh

1. To my mind, there seems to be an inordinate amount of voluntarism attributed to secularism when discussed in terms of state ideologies, legal-constitutional arrangements and ideas, and philosophico-historical world-views; secularism tends to be thought of as a check-list of social, cultural and cognitive characteristics that some try to "implement', that exist in one place and are absent elsewhere. It is certainly incontestable that a number of modern states were animated by a decidedly secularizing impulse and intent, most notably, France, Turkey, Mexico, and the former Communist countries, and that secularization in these countries ultimately took on the aspect of an official creed. But it is equally incontestable that secularization has, by and large, been an objective historical process of systemic import, without necessarily implying a secularizing motif or a secularist ideology. The United Kingdom, for one, is one of the most thoroughly secularized countries on the planet, yet it is a polity in which church dogma is established by acts of parliament, and is a Realm with an official state church headed by the sovereign who still rules by grace of God.

It therefore appears that approaching the question of secularization is one that might more profitably be approached by a nuanced and discriminating historical approach that is unwilling to hold itself captive to polemical tropes and melodramatic scenarios that alternate between the triumphalist and the pathetic. In an historical perspective, it would appear that secularism was indeed the result of institutional, social and cognitive differentiation and restructuration that started in Europe and that spread world-wide in the course of the nineteenth century, to such an extent that it became autochtonous everywehere, being produced and reproduced locally by means of an internal dynamic. This spread of secularization had become possible in many ways, some imposed from outside (most often with local support), others generated in the context of modernizing states like the late Ottoman Empire and its successor states. And just as the spread, depth, and extent of secularization differed considerably among European countries, so it was elsewhere, varying in terms of region, social class or other social group, educational cohort, generation, and so forth. But this is not to say that one might

speak of "multiple secularizations" or "multiple modernities" -- the two are intimately related. There might at first sight seem that there is little more to this multiplication of plurals than a *bien pensant* "recognition" of plurality expressed in a joy supposedly imparted by endlessly promiscuous identitarianism, most particularly if one held, as I do, that such pluralisation has the effect of voiding the notion of modernity – and consequently its plurals – of determinate historico-sociological sense, by a drift, often seemingly irresistible, towards a kind of hyper-empiricism which vitiates the efficacy of the general concept, causing it to devolve to a rather prolix designation of sheer simultaneity.

But there is another, related aspect arising more directly from the systematic questioning of secularism – along with the Enlightenment, reason, modernity and related matters, one that has gathered force under well-known circumstances, crystallised after 1989 and doubtless as a consequence of the world-historical series of events of which it was composed, and having since that time taken on the aspect of an international doxa. The conceptual form this takes is that of a critique of a teleological outlook ascribed to proclamations of secularism. While this might well be true for a certain constituency of such proclamations, especially that beholden to different versions of positivism, it would not seem to hold to the more properly historical considerations of secularism, which recognize differentiations and specificities (more properly specificities, or rather in Hegelian parlance particularities, than individuations) in the context of an overall objective historical trend generated and articulated by dynamics of global reach. Moreover, it might be maintained correlatively that is questioning secularism in the name of the "return" of religion, of the repressed, of the marginal, and so forth, and in assuming that which is seen to return to have been as central yesterday as it seems to be today in certain places, what we have in effect is the dicursive dynamic of a theory of history that is teleological in reverse, conveying a fatalism of origins in reassertion, an inevitable return of social "patterns" that had been in abeyance. Such a theory of history has long been familiar under the name of Romanticism, which presumes historical collectivities, however defined, to have incommensurable inner consistencies (Herder's Kräfte, otherwise Ethos, Weltanschauung, cultural pattern, and their cognates) that are essentially homogeneous, seeking temporal homogenization expressed in continuity.

With the lack of properly historical argumentation, and the reliance on an autonomy/heteronomy model of social transformation, one can have only an argument that is naturalistic: a theory of socio-historical speciation involving much use of organismic metaphors. That social-Darwinism might be considered by those among us who are well-meaning to be malignant does not render its conceptual double from being equally social-Darwinistic, and origins are here construed as having greater ontological weight, as it were, than history: thus secularism in India or the Arab World, for all its historical reality, is described as a sham, as some kind of historical *legerdemain*, lacking in "reality". Where *legerdemain* actually lies, whether it lie in history or in the ahistorical consideration of history, is a matter well-worth consideration.

2. I spoke of secularism in the classical terms of differentiation. Such differentiation was correlative with both a socio-political and a cognitive dynamic, and implied desacralisation throughout (albeit not disenchantment overall, be it with religion, with the state, the nation, or History), barring rhetorico-political or micro-sociological gestures. If we take the Ottoman successor states in the Arab World as an example, we will find the promulgation of civil codes which treat those elements of classical Muslim law as were retained (mainly laws regarding share-cropping and land rent, a late Ottoman development within Hanafi jurisprudence) as "local practice". We will also find that many countries turned over jurisdiction of personal status, the one field which continued to be based largely upon classical Muslim law, duly pruned, to civil courts. The state educational system was thoroughly secular in conception and in administration. Constitutional developments, the formation of political parties, political ideologies, as well as the very concept of the state, and not least the concept of the People in its various acceptations, followed the same pattern. The Muslim clerisy came to occupy a relatively marginal role under state control, and the social functions of the intelligentsia devolved to others (this includes the Islamist intelligentsia, marginal until recently), after centuries of control over the systems of education, justice, and of course cult which remained their preserve. The private resource previouslys at their disposal – the *awqaf* endowments -- were doubly secularized (using an original meaning of the term) by confiscation, or

otherwise by becoming under the control of a government department, usually a ministry, only partly staffed by them.

Moreover, he prevalent cognitive regime was beholden to scientistic conceptions of knowledge (to which Muslim Reformism deferred, thus spawning a plethoric literature on the germs of modern science in the Koran, not unlike some eighteenth-century Jesuit treatments of science and scripture). And though religion was most often treated with respect, this reflected an ambivalence not dissimilar to that which obtained in Germany in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As in Germany and elsewhere, the degree of ambiguity or assimilation of modern developments and their inflections, varied among social groups, regions, and other collectivities.

It would therefore appear that increasing religiosity, and the increasing salience of Islamist politics, is itself the long-term result of differentiation: what it amounts to is not the resurgence or return of patterns in abeyance, but the recasting of religion as a differentiated socio-political sphere carried by groups seeking hegemony. This is well attested by the fact that associated ritualisation of the person, spiritualisation of the public sphere, and the recasting of social and political vocabularies in religious terms is not so much something in conformity with social (or indeed ancestral) practice, as much as one that requires a re-conversion from daily to self-conscious, born-again Islam, virtually a re-socialisation (including a taste for bizarre clothing) which under certain conditions required a considerable degree of social and physical violence (Algeria is a particularly striking example) under "inorganic" conditions for the creation of the individual who is also paradoxically communitarian. Similarly, the political reading of the Koran is a recent phenomenon, like the notion of the Koran being a "blueprint for life", which would have been unthinkable to a medieval or indeed to a nineteenth-century divine. That this forward march to the middle ages implied by identitarian primitivism is celebrated by the distant cheering of postmodernist identitarian preservationism, or by those who advertise abroad their wish to turn their societies into reservations in the modern world, is in the final analysis an irresponsible gentrification of archaism.

Stages of the Secularization of the State

Horst Dreier

I. Terminology and Distinctions

Distinctions are usually made between three different forms and processes of secularization.

First, secularization can mean that there has been a "decline of religious beliefs", a waning of lived religious practice, a decay of faith and its profession, a growing proportion of religiously unaffiliated people in the population, etc. A society's religious bonding is in retreat. This first dimension can, in principle, be "measured" with the instruments of empirical social research.

Second, secularization can function as an intellectual-historical interpretational category that describes the severance of various spheres and areas (art, literature, science) from religious bonding and dominance; Max Weber's concept of the disenchantment of the world offers an effective description of this. More specifically, one thereby means a kind of change in the substance of Christian ideas, a transformation of what was originally religious into something worldly, a re-occupation of central concepts. Famous is Carl Schmitt's dictum that all incisive concepts of public law are secularized theological concepts. Such a transformation has been more concretely demonstrated in the religious quality of language in poetry. But the shift in the legitimation of political rule from religious to worldly justification can also serve as an example. This process has been the subject of a great number of disciplines in cultural studies and the history of ideas.

Third, and finally, secularization can mean an epochal process of differentiation leading to the separation of Church and State, i.e., to a successive religious neutralization of the realm of the state and its institutions and a corresponding privatization (and usually also pluralization) of the practice of faith. The state becomes a secular entity. In particular, this means that the state leaves the decision about final truths, as proclaimed by religion, up to the individuals. The modern secular state is not an order of truth or virtue, but of freedom and peace. This is why it is subject to the commandment of non-identification: it

must not identify with any particular religion or worldview. This process is the object of public law, constitutional history, and political science.

It seems obvious that there is no necessary connection between these three phenomena or aspects. In particular, the first process, the decline of religious beliefs, need not entail the state's religious neutrality. The state's purely worldly legitimation can in fact increase the breadth and intensity of religious faith; and, vice versa, progressive loss of religious bonding in the sense of "decline of religious beliefs" can be accompanied by a state constitution that still recognizes a State Church and in which the separation of Church and State is not fully developed.

In this paper, I am concerned solely with the third aspect and will address secularization as a process of increasing separation of Church and State and the parallel process of the increasing "free exercise" of religion. I will ignore "secularization" in the narrower sense of a sharply defined juridical term for the abolition of clerical principalities and the confiscation of Church property by worldly authorities. The most significant example of such confiscation and transfer is the Reichsdeputationshauptschluß (imperial deputation primary resolution) of 1803, which heralded the end of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.

Here and in the following I will concentrate, in another way as well, on the fundamental aspects of public and constitutional law. They have two sides: the separation of Church and State is, so to speak, the other side of the coin of freedom of belief and religion. Only the religiously neutral state can *completely* provide freedom of religion and belief; only by providing freedom of religion and belief does it become a neutral state. Of course, it was a long and difficult path to get there. And at the same time, this path shows how important a role religious freedom played in the development of modern human rights. We will inspect the essential stages in the following, limiting ourselves mostly to the development in Germany.

To avoid misunderstandings, let me say in advance that the intention of these elaborations is not to present the long and complicated German development, which was not free of retarding aspects, as a model for emulation or generalization. Nor do I assert

that the steps of development traced here are a kind of historically necessary stages. Like all historical processes, this one, too, is unique in its way.

II. Historical Stages of Development

Stage 1: The Investiture Conflict

In his groundbreaking, influential work on "Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation" (the rise of the state as a process of secularization), E.-W. Böckenförde has the process begin with the 11th- and 12th-century conflict over investiture. This may seem surprising. But Böckenförde persuasively shows that the Concordat of Worms, which ended the conflict in 1122, codified a separation between state power and Church institutions. Church offices and state offices were separated; Caesar-Popism was precisely *not* set up. Theory and practice of a long-dominant Imperial Church was factually negated. Although the Christian religion, or more precisely the as yet denominationally undivided Roman Catholic Church, continued to put its stamp on worldly institutions, the Concordat confirmed and underscored a differentiation of the two spheres that was the ideational precondition for the long process of development to the complete separation of Church and State and, in parallel, to the guarantee of complete freedom of religion and belief.

Stage 2: Reformation and the Religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555

The Reformation did not bring complete religious freedom, either; nor did Luther call for it. On the contrary, the competition between two (and soon three) different denominations (Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed or Calvinist) effected a comprehensive and deep-seated "denominalization" of state and social life, with a high degree of pressure for uniformity in the respective territories. Nonetheless, the Religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555 brought the first beginnings of guarantees of religious freedom in the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. This inter-state constitution recognized the Lutheran as well as the Catholic confession. But this duality of belief was not yet an individual freedom of belief, or more precisely: this freedom of belief was the prerogative only of territorial rulers; in the form of the *ius reformandi*, it was primarily a right of rulers: for their freedom to choose their denomination was their right to compellingly determine the religious situation in their respective territories (called the

religious ban). This is not freedom of belief protected against authorities, but rather the authorities' freedom of religion. A country's rulers, not its subjects, have a choice of religion. This is the core of the formulation "*cuius regio, eius religio*". And yet, the Religious Peace of Augsburg brought, as if by reflex, the beginning of a right of freedom guaranteed to the subjects, as well, the *ius emigrandi* (§ 24). This freedom to emigrate was guaranteed as an individual right to inhabitants who had a different confession. It was ultimately based on a choice of confession that deviated from that of the ruler, and it transformed the resulting conflict into a kind of religious liberality.

Stage 3: Peace of Westphalia 1648

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia expanded these beginnings in several ways. First, the duality of denominations was expanded to a trinity of denominations when the Reformed Church was permitted alongside the Catholic and Lutheran Churches (Art. VII IPO); other "sects" remained forbidden. Second, the fixing of 1624 as *Normaljahr* (norming year) limited the territorial ruler's *ius reformandi* – or even abolished it. For in the future there would be free exercise of religion ("*exercitium religionis*") to the degree in which the denominations were allowed to be publicly exercised in sequence or simultaneously. This froze Germany's denominational map for centuries. Thus, unlike in 1555, a state's ruler had to accept that his subjects included persons of various denominations. And finally, with the possibility of home worship (Art. V § 34 IPO), a possibility of religious activity, in addition to the still valid *ius emigrandi*, was created for those who could make no such claim on the basis of the norming year. Here, for the first time, we encounter the formulation *"conscientia libera"*, freedom of conscience. Of course, religious activity in accordance with conscience was only "appropriately" tolerated and was not allowed to be practiced publicly. It was feared that anything else would endanger public security and order. A certain parallel is found where various North American Colonial Charters placed "freedom of conscience" under the proviso to "live quietly under the Civil Government" (Charter of Delaware, 1701) or of "not giving offence or scandal to the government" (Charter of Georgia, 1732). All in all, in 1648, individual privileges were merely a kind of side effect of corporative rights of the imperial estates as religious parties.

Stage 4: Prussia's National Legal Code of 1794

Interestingly, it was Prussia that in the 18th century went markedly beyond the rights guaranteed by the Peace of Westphalia, increasingly practicing equal treatment of the denominations by the state. The toleration of sects was explicitly codified in the Prussian national legal code, the Allgemeine Landrecht (ALR). The three recognized confessions were treated equally and enjoyed the right to practice in public. The state identified with none of them (PrALR 11 II 1 ff.), but subjected them to its supervision and guidance. To this degree, the separation of Church and State had not yet been made complete.

Stage 5: The Pauls Church Constitution of 1848/49; the Weimar Imperial Constitution of 1919

The regulations of the Peace of Westphalia and the enlarged liberalization and pluralization of religion in Prussia were not yet about complete religious freedom in the sense of a fundamental or human right for each person. We encounter such a rule for the first time in the Pauls Church Constitution of 1848/49. There we read in § 144: "Every German has complete freedom of religion and conscience." And § 145: "Every German is unconstrained in the common domestic and public practice of his religion." § 146 then declares that enjoying civil and citizens' rights is neither dependent upon nor limited by a person's religious denomination. And § 147 II draws the conclusion for the organization of the state by setting the norm: "No religious community enjoys privileges over the others through the state; further, there is no State Church."

The regulations in the Weimar Imperial Constitution of 1919 were very similar (Art. 135 ff.).

It is well known that the Pauls Church Constitution never went into effect. Its program was too liberal as a whole to be able to shape political reality at that time. And so the Prussian constitutional document of 1850 exhibits characteristic limitations: the freedom of religious denomination, of associating in religious communities, and of common domestic and public exercise of religion is guaranteed, but, along with a certain privileging of religions with corporative rights (Art. 13), we also find a regulation as if codifying the state's Christian character (Art. 14: "The Christian religion is taken as the foundation for those state institutions that are connected with the practice of religion,

irrespective of the freedom of religion guaranteed in Art. 12."). Clearly, this is no longer a State Church in the formal sense found in the Charte Constitutionelle Francaise of 1814 (Art. 6). But nor is it a complete dismissal of the state from religious ties and duties or the state's neutrality toward religion and worldview. This, as mentioned earlier, did not come until the Weimar Imperial Constitution of 1919.

III. Conclusions and Further Questions

What conclusions can be drawn for the crystallization of a secular state from this *tour d'horizon* through the history of religious freedom in Germany?

The reconstruction of the development demonstrates, first, how conflictual and gradual the development of a secular state was. But it also turns out that successive steps toward secularization, in the sense of the state's withdrawal from the field of religion, can be taken even before an individualistic idea of basic rights begins its triumphal march. The stipulations of the Augsburg and even more of the Westphalian treaties show this very clearly. Here, recognition of plurality is far in advance of the development of a complete individualization of the religious issue. This plurality (first religious duality, then religious trinity), with, as if by reflex, the freedom to emigrate, provides a kind of early individual right and is then increased in 1648 to an acceptance of minority confessions, i.e., tolerance in the real sense, as the regulations on home worship show. The restriction to home worship thereby indicates how important religion remains, as state religion and thus as a form of collective identity. Only when the state completely privatizes the issue of religion as the issue of truth and no longer identifies with any religion or denomination can complete freedom of religion and belief be guaranteed. This ultimately implies the necessary abolition of a State Church.

The other way around, it can be asked whether a complete secularization of state order is possible at all. Is there a logical endpoint of the process of secularization? And even if one had to affirm that this endpoint exists: would it be necessary to strive for it? This question touches what can be called the cultural dimension of our problem. For if it is true that Christianity was a definitively influencing cultural factor in Europe for many centuries, then the associated conditioning cannot simply dissolve in thin air. But to the degree that this conditioning affects the legal order mandatory for all, questions are raised

that are sometimes difficult. I will provide two examples, one from the penal code and one from constitutional law.

Example 1: Penal Code

A meanwhile juridical-historical event of the 1960s is instructive here. At that time, homosexuality (among adult men), procuration, and adultery were all still punishable by law. The justification cited for these laws was usually "moral law", behind which, ultimately, certain Christian values or doctrines were concealed. The abolition of the corresponding penal norms at the end of the 1960s was carried out with the explicit dictum that the penal code could and was permitted only to protect legal goods of the general public and of the individual, but not to protect specific moral or religious viewpoints. Religious neutralization also becomes visible in the fact that blasphemy is no longer an offense, while today it is prohibited to slander not only religious confessions, but also worldviews. The good protected by these norms is also no longer (or not primarily) religion, but public peace.

Example 2: Constitutional Law

Much less clearly resolved so far is the question of the degree to which the constitution of a secular state can explicitly refer to or take support from religious (not necessarily Christian) statements or content. For example, the preamble to the German Basic Law mentions that it was resolved "in responsibility before God". Some Länder (state) constitutions establish the norm of "reverence for God" as a goal of education. And the formulations of oaths, for example those that the Federal President and other state officials take at their inauguration, have a metaphysical reference (with or without religious assertion). And it is also an identification of the state with specific religious signs and statements when the law makes it obligatory to display crosses or crucifixes in classrooms.

Indeed, schools have recently become the preferred field of conflict for debates about the limits of religious freedom and about the secularity of the state. But here we must underscore that they actually always were. The problem was merely solved or, more, silenced through forced denominalization of the schools. In addition, the field of conflict has been quantitatively and qualitatively exacerbated today by Germany's development

from a bi-confessional to a multi-religious political system. Second, it cannot be emphasized enough that precisely the secular state that guarantees religious freedom is confronted with public avowal of belief, with visible practice of religion. Privatization of religion does not mean home worship on the pattern of the Peace of Westphalia, but rather that the state, as sovereign power, behaves neutrally toward the religions. So our manner of speaking of the privatization or de-privatization of religion is somewhat confusing, because it does not recognize the public realm as the natural realm for practicing fundamental rights. Availing oneself of the fundamental right of religious freedom (precisely through its constitutionally guaranteed public exercise by the bearers of fundamental rights), however, necessarily entails that tensions and conflicts can arise – which is true for other fundamental rights, too – whether with other fundamental rights, between various bearers of fundamental religious rights, or in relation to limitations or duties of the state. Here, as with other fundamental rights, the boundary between constitutionally guaranteed freedom and the legitimate possibilities of limiting freedom must be constantly reviewed and, if necessary, revised. The familiar cases that have attracted attention in recent years precisely in Germany (a teacher's headscarf, excusing Muslim girls from sport instruction, slaughtering animals in accordance with religious laws, etc.) show how difficult it is to draw a line satisfactory to all sides. But let me repeat in conclusion: this necessity to set boundaries does not, in principle, distinguish religious freedom from other fundamental rights.

Muslims, Religious Equality and Secularism

Tariq Modood

There is a widespread perception that Muslims are making politically exceptional, culturally unreasonable or theologically alien demands upon European states. My contention is that the logic of Muslim claims-making is European and contemporary. The case of Britain is illustrative. The relation between Muslims and the wider British society and British state has to be seen in terms of a development and rising agendas of racial equality and multiculturalism. Muslims, indeed, have become central to these agendas even while they have contested important aspects of it – especially, the primacy of racial identities, narrow definitions of racism and equality and the secular bias of the discourse and policies of multiculturalism. Emergent Muslim discourses of, eg. respect, have to be understood as appropriations and modulations of contemporary discourses and initiatives whose provenance lie in anti-racism and feminism, and so are at least partly a politics of 'catching-up' with racial equality and feminism.

Religious Equality

If religious equality is conceived in analogous terms to racial equality legislation and policy initiatives, then its main components would be:

1. Prohibition of religious discrimination and incitement to religious hatred;

2. Even-handedness in relation to religions (eg in relation to state funding of schools);

3. Positive inclusion of religious groups.

The latter demand is that religion in general, or at least the category of 'Muslim' in particular, should be a category by which the inclusiveness of social institutions may be judged, as they increasingly are in relation to race and gender. For example, employers should have to demonstrate that they do not discriminate against Muslims by explicit monitoring of Muslims' position within the workforce, backed up by appropriate policies, targets, managerial responsibilities, work environments, staff training, advertisements,

outreach and so on. Similarly, public bodies should provide appropriately sensitive policies and staff in relation to the services they provide, especially in relation to (non-Muslim) schools, social and health services; Muslim community centres or Muslim youth workers should be funded in addition to existing Asian and Caribbean community centres and Asian and black youth workers. To take another case: the BBC currently believes it is of political importance to review and improve its personnel practices and its output of programmes, including its on-screen 'representation' of the British population, by making provision for and winning the confidence of women, ethnic groups and young people. Why should it not also use religious groups as a criterion of inclusivity and have to demonstrate that it is doing the same for viewers and staff defined by religious community membership?

This positive conception of equality extends or supplements an understanding of 'equality' in terms of individualism and cultural assimilation to a politics of recognition; to 'equality' as sharing the public space by showing respect for stigmatised and marginalized groups and cultural heritages. This includes redefining and pluralizing citizenship identities, such as British, so all citizens can see themselves in such identities and can come to have a sense of belonging to the shared whole.

Is Religious Equality a Lesser Equality?

Despite the fact that such a 'religious equality' approach has been developed in N. Ireland since the 1980s, such an approach is meeting resistance in Britain (and elsewhere in Europe, though often the benchmark is lower in the latter). One of the grounds of resistance is that religion is a private matter and should not be the basis of public policies, state provisions and political identities. A supporting argument is that while race, sex and sexuality are ascriptive sources of identity, religion is a matter of choice and so requires a different, lesser, level of regime of equality.

Such a secularist response overlooks that while some religions may define themselves as 'private' in some way, others see themselves as trying to live out a social vision. In any case, if equality is about celebrating previously demeaned identities (eg., in taking pride in one's blackness rather than in accepting it merely as a 'private' matter), then what is being addressed in anti-discrimination, or promoted as a public identity, is a chosen response to one's ascription. Exactly, the same applies to sex and sexuality. We may not choose our sex or sexual orientation but we choose how to politically live with it. Do we keep it private or do we make it the basis of a social movement and seek public resources and representation for it?

Now Muslims and other religious groups, are utilising this kind of argument, and making a claim that religious identity, just like gay identity, and just like certain forms of racial identity, should not just be privatised or tolerated, but should be part of the public space. In their case, however, they come into conflict with an additional fourth dimension of liberal citizenship that we can refer to as secularism: the view that religion is a feature, perhaps uniquely, of private and not public identity.

The position of Muslims in Britain today is similar to the other identities of 'difference' as Muslims catch up with and engage with the contemporary concept of equality (Modood 2005). No one chooses to be or not to be born into a Muslim family. Similarly, no one chooses to be born into a society where to look like a Muslim or to be a Muslim creates suspicion, hostility, or failure to get the job you applied for. Though how Muslims respond to these circumstances will vary. Some will organise resistance, while others will try to stop looking like Muslims (the equivalent of 'passing' for white); some will build an ideology out of their subordination, others will not, just as a woman can choose to be a feminist or not. Again, some Muslims may define their Islam in terms of piety rather than politics; just as some women may see no politics in their gender, while for others their gender will be at the centre of their politics.

Those who see the current Muslim assertiveness as an unwanted and illegitimate child of multiculturalism have only two choices if they wish to be consistent. They can repudiate the idea of equality as identity recognition and return to the 1960s liberal idea of equality as colour/sex/religion etc blindness. Or they can argue that equality as recognition does not apply to oppressed religious communities, perhaps uniquely not to religious communities. To deny Muslims positive equality without one of these two arguments is to be open to the charge of double standards.

Secularism

Hence a programme of racial and multicultural equality is not possible today without a discussion of the merits and limits of secularism. Secularism can no longer be treated as 'off-limits', or, as President Jacques Chirac said in a major speech in 2004, 'non-negotiable'. Not that its really a matter of being for or against secularism, but rather a careful, institution by institution analysis of how to draw the public-private boundary and further the cause of multicultural equality and inclusivity.

My view indeed is that secularism *as it exists*, rather than as an *ideology*, is actually a resource for extending and institutionalising multicultural equality. For secularism in practice has been a series of evolving compromises with organised religion – this is certainly true in Britain as well as most European states, even France. Each state has developed its own modus vivendi : in Britain there is an established church with a presence in the House of Lords but politicians are shy (unlike their US counterparts) of talking about religion; in the Netherlands there is pillorisation; in Germany the state collects tithes on behalf of the churches, which are regarded as important corporate social partners etc. Moreover, these institutional compromises are being extended to accommodate the growing and assertive Muslim populations (Modood,, Triandafyllidou and Zapata-Barrero, 2006). So, neither religious equality as part of multicultural recognition and institutional accommodation of organised religion are contrary to existing, pragmatic secularism and each can mutually support the other to achieve the political accommodation of Muslims (and other religious minorities). These

accommodations will inevitably vary from country to country; there is no exemplary solution, for contemporary solutions, like their historical predecessors, too will depend on the national context and will not have a once-and-for-all-time basis.

One mode of recognition is for the new minority faiths like Islam to be represented in relation to the state by their spiritual leaders like the Anglican Church is by its bishops, or even, indeed, as the Catholic Church is in Britain. For while the Catholic Church is not an established church it has a clear relationship with the British, especially English, state (eg., it is the single biggest beneficiary of state funding of faith schools) and it is its ecclesiastical hierarchy that are taken to be speaking for Catholics.

My own preference would be for an approach that would be less corporatist, less statist and less churchy – in brief, less French. An approach in which civil society played a greater role would be more comfortable with there being a variety of Muslim voices, groups and representatives. Different institutions, organisations and associations would seek to accommodate Muslims in ways that worked for them best at a particular time, knowing that these ways may or ought to be modified over time and Muslim and other pressure groups and civic actors may be continually evolving their claims and agendas.

Conclusion

The approach to religious equality as part of multicultural citizenship that is being argued for here, then, consists of:

1. A reconceptualisation of civic equality from sameness to (also) an incorporation of a respect for difference.

2. A reconceptualisation of secularism from the concepts of neutrality and the strict public/private divide to a moderate and evolutionary secularism based on institutional adjustments.

3. A pragmatic, case by case, negotiated approach to dealing with controversy and conflict, not an ideological, drawing a 'line in the sand' mentality.

While this runs against certain interpretations of secularism, it is not inconsistent with what secularism means in practice in Europe. We should let this evolving, moderate secularism and the spirit of compromise it represents be our guide. Unfortunately, an ideological secularism is currently being reasserted and generating European domestic versions of 'the clash of civilisations' thesis and the conflicts that entails for European societies. That some people are today developing secularism as an ideology to oppose Islam and its public recognition is a challenge both to pluralism and equality, and thus to some of the bases of contemporary democracy. It has to be resisted no less than, say, the radical anti-secularism of some Islamists and others.

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Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin

1. To discuss Jews and Zionism in the context of "Contemporary debates in the West: secular norms, multiculturalism, and immigrant (Muslim) incorporation" means to integrate two different perspectives from which we should approach the question: first, the historical analysis of the Jewish existence as a "problem" for modern secularism, a problem that persist in the "problem" of Muslim minorities in Europe today. As was convincingly demonstrated recently by Gil Anidjar, what is covered by the heading "Europe and the Jews" cannot be dissociated from the matter of "Islam and the West." The secularization of European Jewish discourse, that is, the attempt to distinguish it from Christian-Jewish polemics, was tantamount to its reformulation in obvious Orientalist terms both with regard to the debate over the civility of the Jews and their rights, and with regard to the various Jewish responses which have emerged in this framework.

The second perspective is the one provided by Zionism as a project of westernization of the Jews., As I have argued elsewhere, that has been done through an internalization of Christian perceptions of the Jews and their exile. This was done by advancing the category of the "Judeo-Christian," a category that was essential to the process of secularization. The "Judeo-Christian" was to be distinguished from the East, from the Arab, and finally, from Islam.

Zionism, the state of Israel and the question of Palestine provide an essential frame within which many aspects and perspectives that have been raised and studied during the ongoing debates on secularism and secularization, as well as the interrelations between them, can be observed in a most concentrated way: the theological sources of "secularization", being a process embedded within Christian theology, and the growing awareness of the politico-theological dimensions of the modern political sphere; Zionist discourse also demonstrates the obvious Orientalism inherent in the notion of the secular, as well as its practice as a colonial mechanism of control and division. The centrality of the political theological aspect in the formation and definition of the state of Israel is undeniable, and consequently any attempt to separate religion from nationalism, religion

from the state, is impossible. At the same time, the critique of Zionist discourse from this dual perspective, as can be reflected in some current Israeli approaches, may also contribute to the ongoing discussions in Europe.

2. The national-historical consciousness associated with the secular, is itself rooted in the theological myth. The national myth is based on the perception of Zionist settlement and sovereignty over Palestine as the return of the Jews to their homeland, as the fulfillment of Jewish history, and the realization of Jewish expectations. In that respect, Zionist national consciousness was not distinct from the theological myth, but was rather a particular interpretation of that myth. God was excluded from the discourse, yet Divine Promise continued to govern political activity and to serve as its source of legitimacy. In spite of other, very important differences, this version was accepted by most Zionist trends, and is also an essential moment in the definition of the state, its symbols and major Laws. Accordingly, one can summarize the secular perception as follows: God does not exist, but he promised us the Land.

The State of Israel is a theological concept, and carries with it the apocalypse. This does not mean that Zionism should be seen as a realization of traditional Jewish messianic attitudes. Although previous Jewish ideas had been integrated into Zionist culture, the articulation of the myth as a modern national myth follows images, values and terms borrowed from the context of Protestantism. The very term "State of Israel" first appeared as a political concept within Christian millenarian groups from the sixteenth, and most particularly the seventeenth century – when the discussion of the ancient Hebrew state dominated the political and philosophical discourse, and the idea of the restoration of the Jews was elaborated in many circles. It occurred in the same context in which the very notion of the state as we know it has emerged. One can see the modern biblical image of the Jews as the model of modern Nationalism and colonialism, and it is from this context that the various conflicting Zionist ideas could emerge. The national representation of the Jews, their exile and their redemption manifest the Christian perception of the Jews and their exile, and the denial of Jewish concepts, as embodied in the concept of "exile". The "secular" Zionist return addressed the same context and the same images of protestant theology and millenarian imagination: the Land of Israel in the period of the Second Temple" the time of Jesus Christ. Like Protestantism, Zionism is

also established on the rejection of the authority of traditional canon, and the return to the Bible, in the sense of sola scriptura.

In that sense Zionism is both the extension of the Western political myth, as well as the exception. Perhaps, the extreme manifestation of the rule. And indeed, in many aspects Israel can be seen as the state of exception, the exception of the West. The state is a mission of redemption. That redemption is associated with the apocalypse, and the idea of the state as redemptive is always accompanied by the anxiety of destruction.

On these grounds the critique of Zionism should be seen as part of the critique of secularism in general, and not as an exceptional case study.

3. The distinction between "secular" and "religious" identities is one of the common categorizations used to describe Israeli society and culture. Often presented as a clash between two opposite civilizations or between "democracy" and "theocracy", the secular/religious distinction has been also frequently presented as parallel to the debate over the "peace process".

This common description is deceptive and superficial, and itself should be considered as part of the construction of the "secular". More than a satisfactory description of reality, it is an ideological construction from which the definition of the "secular" as "enlightened", "modern" and "civil" is contrasted with the »primordial«, »nationalistic«, »primitive« attributed to religious culture. In its structure, images and intentions, it is an obvious manifestation of the Orientalism that is intrinsic to all the categorical dichotomies commonly used to describe Israeli society: Jews/Arabs, Ashkenazim/Mizrahim, as well as secular/religious. It is an obvious manifestation of the Orientalism that is an inseparable part of the construction of the secular.

More than it teaches us about "religion", this description teaches us about the secular and its perception of "peace". It takes the secular for granted and prevents the analysis of its various aspects. It's true that religious groups (albeit certainly not all) have adopted a right-wing ultra-nationalistic attitude, and radical messianic groups have led the policy of settlement in the occupied territories. My argument, however, is that these trends should be seen as the effect of the secular, not as its rejection. Not only does the secular not provide an alternative, it creates the framework and perceptions that were later adopted

by religious groups. These interpretations became possible due to the visualization of the present in redemptive terms, and the ambivalent and obscure attitude towards Messianism in Zionist »secular« thought.

4. The very terms of the secular/religious debate define the borders of collectivity as exclusively Jewish, and determine the exclusion of the Arabs citizens: on the various occasions in which the debate between "religious" and "secular" identities has been reproduced (in the academy, the media and so on) – the participants are exclusively Jews. Palestinian Israeli citizens, even when they obviously hold »secular« attitudes are not considered as participants. Being an Arab and being secular are considered mutually exclusive categories. In fact, the debate excludes not only the Palestinians, but also Oriental Jews (including non-orthodox), for whom the religious/secular dichotomy is obviously foreign, a category that has been imposed upon Sephardi-Oriental Jews in the same way that it was imposed on other groups in the colonial context.

The issue therefore is not »secularism« but Jewish nationalism. The term "secular" does not refer to a civil vision, one that is inclusive of Jews, Arabs and others – but explicitly and inexorably to a Jewish one. The debate is therefore between two visions of a Jewish homogeneous collectivity. Rather than dividing the nation, as it is often assumed to do, this debate in fact creates and defines its boundaries through implicit inclusions and exclusions. By accepting that framework of discussion, the secular participants even strengthen and emphasize the ethnic boundaries, and the actual understanding of the term.

5. The myth of the return leaves no place to the land, and denies its history. It is considered to be in exile, with no culture of its own, no people living in its domain, its various histories and images have been erased. In this context, the concrete Arab existence on the land was deemed inconsequential, and subsequently rejected to the point of utter obliteration. Even before the actual expulsion of the Palestinians, the theological language that dominated the land had denied their existence and their Arabic language. The construction of Israel's image as an innocent community and as the revival of »ancient Israel« was thus based on the suppression of Palestinian history and the rejection of any responsibility toward its former population.

In that sense, Palestine is the marker of the secular, resisting the Judeo-Christian redemptive image in the name of civil and national rights. Palestine is the secular of the Holy Land, and to reject Palestine means to reject the very possibility to discuss secularism, while maintaining the redemptive messianic myth, preserving a permanent anxiety – the anxiety of the Messaiah, and the anxiety of the land, of the Palestinians whose very national identity is denied by the myth of the state.

6. On these grounds the only way to define a context of discussion on secularization (that is to say, decolonization), is a bi-national one, one that includes both Jews and Arabs. I do not suggest one state (the common use of the term), but rather as a necessary framework for discussion, one that take into consideration the different collective identities, and reject the mechanism of denial and division determined by the theological-colonial consciousness identified with the secular.

It is not surprising that the prominent figures who first proposed the bi-national idea in Palestine during the 20th were non-secular – figures like Buber, Scholem Magness and Simon were aware of the theological implications of the Zionist myth, as well as of the colonial direction taken after the Balfour declaration. Binationalism means to distinguish the land from the myth of the land, Palestine from the holy land.

Bi-national thinking is essential for the discussion of Israel/Palestine, but its implication may be wider than that. Binationalism is to challenge the dichotomy Jew-Arab, and thus the dichotomy West-East, Christian-Muslim. These are obviously different contexts, and the political questions, as well as optional policies are certainly not the same. But in both cases, it is secularism that create sharp boundaries and mechanism of exclusion.

Private religion goes public

Astrid Reuter

Conflicts between religions and secular institutions are increasing and have become once again a topic that triggers off large public controversies in most Western societies. This is, among other reasons, due to the fact that since the 1980ies the constitutional principles and laws that regulate religion are being confronted with religious traditions (such as Islam) that had not been of much significance in Western Europe when these constitutional principles and laws were enacted. The main feature of these legal settings is the separation of public (state and society) and private spheres, including the commitment of the state to secularity, i.e. to neutrality in terms of religion and worldview, which is considered as a taken-for-granted condition for the freedom of religion (in both the positive and the negative sense).

The stereotyped talk of the state's secularity is based on the assumption that the spheres of state, society and privacy might be clearly separated from each other and that the radius of action of religious institutions might be restricted (at least legally) to the latter ones. Looking back at European history, however, one observes that the boundaries between state, society and privacy have constantly been a focus of conflict. In the course of secularization, previously religious domains (such as education, marriage, welfare, funeral etc.) have been gradually transferred into the state's realm, either completely (as in the case of marriage) or partially (as in the cases of education, welfare and funeral). These partial transfers have resulted in what one could call 'border zones' between state and religion, or rather – as I relate here to Western European countries, namely to France and Germany – between the state and the Christian churches. In the German *Staatskirchenrecht* ('law of state-church-relations') these 'border zones' are referred to as *res mixtae* ('matters of common concern'). The education system which has been a central stage for politico-religious conflicts and controversies since about two centuries is one of the traditional *res mixtae*. In the course of long-lasting passionate conflicts it has been withdrawn step by step from the formerly nearly exclusive responsibility of the churches and has eventually been taken over by the state.

This example may show that the common characterization of the secularization process as being basically a process of social differentiation and, in consequence, of *privatization* of religion is questionable. Secularization has instead been to a large extent a process of a 'hostile takeover' of religiously controlled fields of action by and in favour of the state (i.e. a process of *Verstaatlichung*). The struggle for influence in certain fields of social life between religions (or denominations) on the one and the state on the other hand is still going on. After a (rather short) period of relative harmony between the churches and the secular state, the conflicts over the boundaries of religion and state have recurred once again and are recently reaching new intensity, particularly in the field of education, as the many conflicts over school-crosses, headscarves, religious instruction etc. and the large public controversies they have been sparking off, show.

These conflicts are frequently being interpreted as evidences for a process of *de-privatization* of religion and as the first steps towards a new period of 'public religion', bringing to an end the secularization process and marking the outset of a counter-process of de-secularization. However, if one considers secularization not merely as a process of social differentiation and, as a result, of privatization of religion, but as a shifting of boundaries between the fields of influence of religion and state (in favour of the latter), this conceptualization does not seem suitable. The recent conflicts over religion then rather appear as struggles for a religious re-conquest of spheres of influence that had been taken over by the state in the course of secularization. Consequently, they are not appropriately grasped if one describes them as being struggles for the *de-privatization* of religion. Instead, it would seem more suitable to characterize them, on the contrary, as evidences of an increased demand for the free exercise of *private* religion in the public sphere.

"Contemporary Muslim Debates on Secularization and the Western discourse on Islam"

Nilüfer Göle

The debates on secularism take a new turn in relation to the new claims of muslims in the public sphere. During the last two decades, both in muslim countries and in European contexts, secularism is debated, scrutinized from the prism of islamic politics. The secular definitions of modern State power, public sphere, and citizenship and gender rights are becoming a battleground for a critical examination of cultural values of democracy. Comparison of Turkey and France can provide us with a double-perspective, that is both from the point of view of a muslim-majority context and a European immigration context, to understand the changing terms of the debate on islam and secularism.

Ebrahim Moosa

Duke University

Polemical literature offers a window into some of the debates about secularism within contemporary Muslim societies. My presentation will explore the lineaments of one such polemic, especially those offered by "traditionalists" in the Middle East and India. The category traditionalist is also very elusive, since it includes a spectrum of traditionalists. But the generic category in practice would be those who designate themselves as 'ulama in Muslim societies, even though the status, location and function of say the `ulama in India and Pakistan differ considerably from that of their counterparts in the Middle East, while there are also some overlapping elements.

The polemic occurs at the level of the Islamic Fiqh (Jurisprudence) Academy (IFA), a committee of The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), a rather toothless organization since its decisions and resolutions do not have any binding character on any of the member states. The value of IFA is that as a talk-shop or forum of a trans-national body, it meticulously collects and documents a range of juridical and ethical issues debated in the forum. (The IFA forum is dominated by Arabic-speaking traditionalists with one representative from each of Pakistan and Iran, while excluding representation from from other non-Arabic speaking countries such as Indonesia, the largest Muslim population in the world and India's 130 to 150 million Muslims. leave alone significant minorities in Africa, Asia and Europe.

What is interesting is that traditionalists conceive of secularism, `almana and `alamaniya, from at least two perspectives: 1. It is a European problem that has been imposed on non-European societies, societies that did not have the same genealogy as Europe.
2. Traditionalists view secularism as threatening to tradition in epistemic terms.

The main targets of the traditionalist fury are contemporary Arab and Muslim thinkers. The engagement of such thinkers with European intellectual traditions, of course, compel them to ask different kinds of questions in relation to the Muslim intellectual traditions. Even though inherited Muslim intellectual traditions are variegated and highly plural, it is

interesting that traditionalists represent their view of tradition as singular and reified. At times it appears that the adversaries of the traditionalists, also provide a monolithic picture of the tradition.

However, the thrust of the polemic center on questions of epistemology-the relationship of reason to revelation, science and religion- and history.

CLOSING THE DEBATE ON SECULARISM: A Personal Statement[5]

Ashis Nandy

The Gujarat riots of 2002 should make us openly admit what we all secretly know but cannot publicly acknowledge—that the theory and practice of fighting religious and ethnic strife, armed with the ideology of secularism, has not helped us much, not at least in South Asia. Nothing seems to have changed since the violent days of 1946-48, when the first genocidal riots based on Hindu-Muslim divide took place in South Asia. From the complicity of political parties to the partiality of the police and the administration, from touching but effete resolutions demanding action, passed by the usual suspects, to sane words of advise from well-known universities abroad, now fortified by a galaxy of western scholars of South Asian origin, eagerly trying to remote control the backward and the poor towards a better future. The only thing that has changed is the level of brutality, which has now risen high enough to acquire pornographic dimensions.

Today, we seem to be back to square one. There are some remarkable similarities between the Partition riots of 1946-48 and the Gujarat carnage, especially in the way the violence spread to villages in the interior of Gujarat and almost the entire urban middle class was won over by the rhetoric of hatred. This is a wrong context in which to examine the vicissitudes of the Indian experiment with secularism. But I shall do so nonetheless, because it is doubtful if anything worthwhile can be built in this part of the world unless the rubble of dead categories occupying public space is cleared up first. That is not an easy task in a recipient culture of knowledge, though somewhat similar doubts have arisen recently about secularism in sections of the western knowledge industry too. 'The historical modus vivendi called secularism', asserts political theorist William Connolly ungraciously, 'is coming apart at the seams'.[6] Similar conclusions can be teased out of

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[5] This is a revised version of a note presented at the symposium on Siting Secularism—whatever that means—at the Oberlin College, Department of Human Resources, 19-21 April 2002. However, I made a different presentation there, in response to the nature of the debates going on in the symposium. An earlier, briefer version was published in *The Little Magazine*, August 2002.

[6] William E. Connolly, *Why I am not a Secularist* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1999), p. 19.

the works of three other important political theorists apparently married to secularism—Richard Falk, Paul Ricoeur and Charles Taylor in recent years . Perhaps the arguments against secularism will now begin to acquire some respectability in the former colonies, too. Against this background, I revisit the domain of secularism and its politics in India.

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First of all, saying that secularism is in decline is an empirical statement and can be defended and attacked on empirical grounds. Whether one should say it in public is a different issue. I have said so to explore other ideas that may work better in the tropics. However, I have also added that the record of secularism was not disreputable in the first three decades of Independent India when, paradoxically, it was not explicitly present in the Constitution.[7] It is the record of the ideology after the expansion of political participation and the acceleration of the process of secularization that is dubious. Those who like to think that my primary objection to secularism is cultural will surely not accuse me of believing that the contradiction between secularism and culture did not exist twenty-five years ago.[8] Strangely, when I first expressed my doubts about the efficacy of secularism twenty-five years ago, it was already a cliché among activists and scholar-activists. There was a consensus in India that secularism was not in the best of health in the country and there was much lamentation on that count. That consensus survives. It also cuts across ideological boundaries and disciplines. There is little difference on the subject between Asghar Ali Engineer and Lal Krishna Advani, Triloki Nath Madan and Achin Vanaik or, for that matter, between the functionaries of the India's main political parties. The differences that exist and have led to bitter debates in academic circles are about the reasons and the possible responses to this decline.

Before turning to these causes and responses, please allow me a word on the angry responses to my three earlier essays on secularism.[9] My writings seem to arouse

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[7] Though the Constitution was always secular, secularism as an ideology entered the Constitution for the first time during the Emergency in 1975-77 when civil rights were suspended by Indira Gandhi.

[8] Ashis Nandy, 'An Anti-Secularist Manifesto' (1980), in *The Romance of the State and The Fate of Dissent in the Tropics* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 34-60

[9] Ashis Nandy, 'An Anti-Secularist Manifesto'; 'The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance', *Time Warps: The Insistent Politics of Silent and Evasive Pasts* (New Delhi:

more hostility when they coincide, accidentally or otherwise, with something that many feel tempted to say, pushed by the insistent realities of life, but do not, for reasons of political and academic correctness. Because they have to fight within themselves the conclusions they have drawn, they feel disturbed, guilty and complicit when someone else brings them to the fore. Many criticisms of my writings, whether by worthy scions of metropolitan India or by living symbols of academic respectability elsewhere, act as forms of exorcism. Sunil Khilnani is so offended by criticisms of the concept of secularism because he himself considers secularism a 'withered concept' and his commitment to secularism is, what psychoanalysts call, counterphobic.[10]

The second reason for discomfort has little to do with my position. Any plea for nonmodern, traditional or people's knowledge in public life arouses the fear that such knowledge might lead to large-scale displacement or uprooting in the domain of intellectual work, that the familiar world of knowledge might shrink, if not collapse and, in the new world that may come into being, there would be less space for the likes of us. What Sigmund Freud says about the inescapable human fantasy of immortality—our inability to visualize a world without us—applies in this case, too. Many of us are haunted by the question: 'What will be my place in a non-secular or nonmodern world?' India's newly empowered urban middle class just cannot conceive of a good society without its ideas and itself at the helm.

Now, to the causes and responses to the decline of secularism. The standard diagnosis preferred by Hindu nationalists is that secularism has failed because, as practised by their political opponents, mainly the Gandhians and the Leftists, secularism has meant the appeasement of minorities. The Hindu nationalists feel that Indian secularism, in practice, has been always biased against the Hindus. Particularly after independence, the kinds of reforms introduced in Hindu society—say, through measures like the Hindu Code Bill—have never been attempted in the case of other religions. What the Hindu nationalists want is genuine secularism, as opposed to the pseudo-secularism of most other parties but mainly of the Indian National Congress and the Leninists.

Permanent Black, 2002), pp. 61-88; and 'The Twilight of Certitudes: Secularism, Hindu Nationalism and Other Masks of Deculturation', in Nandy, *The Romance of the State*, pp. 61-82.

[10] Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1997).

This might look like unalloyed hypocrisy, but it is also a clever political ploy designed to corner political opponents. One random evidence is that, today, only the Hindu nationalists have been left pleading for a uniform civil code. Almost all other mainstream parties oppose it. India must be the only country in the world where the ethnonationalists plead for a uniform civil code, their opponents oppose it. But then India is the only country where the ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, leading what some might call the world's largest fundamentalist formation, can boast that all its founding-fathers (Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Keshav Hegdewar and Balakrishna Munje) were non-believers or or half-hearted believers. Only about fifteen years after its establishment could the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh, the RSS, find a believing Hindu to head it in Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar. Indeed, the Bible of the formation, *Hindutva* by Savarkar, flaunts its author's atheism in a number of places and Savarkar's hagiographers have to hide the fact that he was a non-believer. Nor have the BJP and its main ideological allies ever rejected secularism.[11] (That itself should have made at least some thinkers suspicious of the concept.) The policies and actions of the Hindu nationalists may often have not been secular, but a part of their soul has always been. Nathuram Godse's last testament in court, in which in a number of places he accuses Gandhi of flouting the canons of secular statecraft, is an example.[12] The testament attacks Gandhi for burdening the young Indian nation-state with an irrational, nonsecular, ideological baggage that includes items like soul force, fasting and nonviolence—a position that most modern Indians would love to endorse but are too embarrassed to do.[13] The opponents of Hindu nationalism, not finding any intellectual meaningful response to these anomalies, pretend that they do not exist or paper over them with the help of what they think are trendy, imported theories of fundamentalism and religious extremism but in reality are a set of clichéd slogans from the 1930s.

[11] In one of the most inane judgements since independence, the Supreme Court of India has virtually equated Hindutva with Hinduism, which neither Savarkar, who invented the term Hindutva, nor the RSS has dared to do. Justice J. S. Verma, who delivered the judgement, has in recent years claimed, more than once, that the politicians have misused his judgement, without admitting that the judgement has given a suspect political ideology the status of a religion. See, for instance, 'My Verdict was Misinterpreted', *Hindustan Times,* 7 February 2003.

[12] Nathuram Godse, *May It Please Your Honour* (Delhi: Surya Prakashan, 1987)

[13] Ashis Nandy, 'Final Encounter: The Politics of the Assassination of Gandhi', in *At the Edge of Psychology: Essays in Politics and Culture* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 70-98.

The other diagnosis of the failure of secularism, which many liberals venture, holds that secularism would have flowered in India but for recalcitrant, nasty politicians and a biased law and order machinery. The usual solution to the problem, offered by the loveable innocents who venture the diagnosis—from historian Mushirul Hasan to sociologist Dipankar Gupta to journalist Praful Bidwai—is that if the ungodly in the administration and policy élite can be eliminated, secularism would work in its pristine form. Heavier doses of the same medicine is the only possible remedy for the ailment called religious violence.

I would love to agree with this diagnosis. Only I am cussed enough to suspect the premise that, after adequate exhortations from academic pulpits or newspaper columns, South Asian politicians, police and bureaucracy will suddenly, like some characters in popular Bombay films, have a spectacular change of heart and begin to behave like obedient school children. To expect politicians to jeopardize their political survival by not mobilizing on ethnoreligious grounds or the coercive apparatus of the state not to play footsy with politicians in power is like expecting academics to ignore the latest intellectual fashions and be propelled solely by the lure of de-ideologized empirical truths. Nor do I see the urban middle-class movements going far by themselves.

Thirdly, there is a variation on the second position that claims that the Indian state and a sizeable section of its functionaries have never been entirely secular and wholeheartedly implemented secular policies. They have made compromises all the way. For instance, instead of being irreligious, they have tried to get away with equal respect for all religions. This was bound to lead to disaster sometime or other, and we face that disaster today. Academic boy scouts like Dipankar Gupta are cocksure that what India needs today is a tough dose of 'secular intolerance'. Once again, I wish I could sympathize with this formulation. My belief is that states in South Asia usually muddle through a series of crises on a day-to-day basis. The kind of agency and coherence often imputed to these impersonal entities is usually a projection of our inner needs and anthropomorphic fantasies of a parental state; such feel-good attributions are a tribute to our trusting nature rather than to political acumen. State-formation and nation-building have been criminal enterprises everywhere in the world and, if I may re-read R. J. Rummell's data on the basis of new data on genocides, they show that of about 200

million killed in genocides in the twentieth century, only a fraction were killed in religious violence and a huge majority killed by their own governments.[14] Of those killed by states, a large majority—at least two-third,, according to my rough calculation—was killed by secular states. The true heroes of secularism in the last hundred years have been Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Mao Tse Tung and Pol Pot. To trust the modern state to ensure religious tolerance, even when that state is secular, is a form of innocence that the existential psychoanalyst, Rollo May, would have certainly found 'inauthentic'.[15]

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Finally, there are the scholars who believe that something is drastically wrong with the idea of secularism itself, particularly in societies that do not share the experiences of Europe, do not have sharp inter-religious boundaries or church-like structures. These societies have for centuries lived with immense religious diversities and memories of colonial domination exercised by secular states. In such societies it matters that the concept of secularism is insufficiently grounded in culture, especially vernacular culture, that the concept makes virtually no sense to the common run of citizens. The picture gets even more fuzzy in complex, multi-religious, non-western societies where the citizens enjoy democratic rights and, hence, the ability to bring their preferences—including, horror of horrors, their Oriental prejudices, stereotypes, and other scandalous irrationalities, their ill-educated selves and terribly underdeveloped political awareness— into the public sphere. In that awareness, secularism has either no place or only a superficial presence. If you allow me the right to my own cliché, these are societies that enjoy the luxury of electing their political leaders periodically but alas, to the chagrin of their progressive academics, not the right to elect their people.

In the storms in tea cup that periodically strike the Indian academe, the last group of scholars are accused of supporting the most retrograde elements in society, though it is quite likely that many in the group do not like their own prognosis. In India, two critics of secularism, Triloki Nath Madan and Partha Chatterjee, have by no means jettisoned

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[14] R. J. Rummell, *Death by Government* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); and *Power Kills* (New Brunswick, NL: Transaction, 1997).

[15] Rollo May, *Power and Innocence* (New York: Norton, 1972).

the idea of secularism. Claims that they have done so are illiterate, if not dishonest and motivated.[16] They might even be happy if their prognosis is proved wrong. Their main crime is that their diagnosis of the future of secularism in Indian public life can be said to be bleak. In the case of Chatterjee, even that is not the whole story. He merely argues that secularism *in its present form* is politically unviable; he feels he has a treatment for his patient. Both Madan and Chatterjee are like doctors who, after detailed pathological tests, feel called upon to inform the patient's relatives that the patient's days might be numbered. However, it is customary in the rat race called the global academic culture to shoot those who pronounce a concept or a theory a terminal case. Madan and Chatterjee are being accused not only of being bad clinicians, but also of having homicidal intentions towards their patients.

My case is different. I have given a pathologist's report and declared the patient incurable. I have said that secularism has had a reasonably good life and has done some good to the society, but has now exhausted its possibilities. I may not have pleaded for euthanasia but I have said that it is time to give up on the patient and look towards a new generation of concepts. And I have said all this with a touch of glee, without obediently shedding tears for secularism. Being part of a small religious minority in India, I have always grudged the patronizing, arrogant Brahminism that has tinged South Asia's academic secularism. And the grudge shows. My critics have reasons to be bitter that I do not want to save my skin under their expert guidance, by declaring my allegiance to the textbooks and rituals the benevolent guides have borrowed for my benefit from Europe's past. Nor do I want to establish my credentials as a progressive by being a docile, housebroken member of a minority who has certifiably correct ideas and, hence, deserves the protection of the Indian state.

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[16] See for example, Khilnani's *The Idea of India*, which accuses Madan of pleading for majoritarian rule, then recommends to his readers Madan's book, which specifically argues against majoritarian rule, and then goes on to argue in the same breath that Madan seems to plead for minoritarian rule in the form of a Brahminic polity. Even more comic is the argument of those who pompously declare that my distinction between religion as faith and religion as ideology is not empirically sustainable. Why, when the distinction is empirically derived and the authors themselves cannot produce an iota of evidence to sustain their argument? Why, when that distinction is used by many religious leaders and political thinkers in the South? Why, when even many researchers committed to secularism routinely use the difference, without naming it, to explain the political use of religion? See also Ashis Nandy, 'The Twilight of Certitudes.'

Fortunately, irrespective of my personal likes and dislikes, secularism in India is unlikely to flourish, at least in the near future. It might have staged an academic comeback in the Indian haute bourgeoisie, as a form of rebrahminization and as a form of spontaneous resistance in some sections of modern India to the growing communal violence, but that has little to do with its political career. The only way secularism can stage a political comeback is by ensuring the dominance of the English-speaking, middle-class in Indian politics. This may seem feasible in the very long run, given the steady growth in size and prominence of the class in India, but it is obviously impossible in the foreseeable future. Once again, this is an empirical, not normative judgement. Here my critics have got it wrong. It is not the incompatibility of secularism with Indian culture—important though that is—but the political non-sustainability of secularism at moments of increasing political participation that has prompted me to look for alternatives. There are many alien practices with which the Indians have learnt to live. Many have learnt to say 'thank you'; others use toilet tissues or play cricket. In the case of secularism they do not feel obliged to learn. Mukul Kesavan recognizes this but cannot admit it. To protect his familiar world, he stretches the meaning of secularism to include in it all forms of noncommunal attitudes. Like the medieval geographer who concluded that the best map of a country had to be as large as the country.[17]

The alternatives to secularism I have explored might not be as good as secularism. Achin Vanaik, the Sikh Samurai never at a loss for words, has argued at ridiculous length that the alternatives I have advanced are inferior or inadequate.[18] He has wasted his breath. I am perfectly willing to accept that. Not only because I believe that those staying in the tropics prefer and deserve only the second-rate but also because, living in a democracy, we have no option but to build upon the second-rate that the majority prefers. Yes, the main argument is that there has arisen a contradiction between democracy and secularism. Secularism may been once an emancipatory idea but for too long it has had a built-in principle of exclusion and it is the exluded, living with their infantile, retrogressive ideas, forming parts of a tacit normative framework informing everyday

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[17] Mukul Kesavan, *Secular Common Sense* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2001)

[18] Achin Vanaik, *Communalism Contested: Religion, Modernity and Secularization* (New Delhi: Sage, 1997).

life, which have resisted religious and ethnic violence in India.[19] Imperfectly I am sure, because these ideas too are associated with principles of exclusion, but at least these, as parts of a tacit normative frame informing everyday life, are more accessible to the public. Among these are old-fashioned neighbourliness or rather principles of neighbourliness, the principles of hospitality encrypted in the various religious traditions, and the persistence of community ties.[20]

My weakness for these ideas has come not merely from my own research and association with human rights groups, but also from studies of resistance at the ground level. It is also influenced by about three decades of exposure to empirical data, most of them produced by avowed secularists. It is not my fault that these secularists fear their own data and experiences. (Asghar Ali Engineer typifies this fear. The data he has amassed over the last thirty years say one thing, he himself says something else. In one incarnation he speaks for secularism, in another, works for a liberation theology in Islam, trying hard at every step to forget that liberation theory in its home ground, South America, is explicitly non-secular and has openly tried to defy the conventional European and North American insistence on the separation of religion and politics.[21]) Nor are my formulations disjunctive with available comparative data on resistances to ethnoreligious strife. For instance, research on the non-Jewish Germans who rescued Jewish victims in

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[19] Ashis Nandy, Shikha Trivedi, Achyut Yagnik and Shail Mayaram, *Creating a Nationality: The Ramjanmabhumi Movement and Fear of the Self* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Ashis Nandy, *An Ambiguous Journey to the City: The Village and Other Odd Ruins of the Self in the Indian Imagination* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), Ch 4. See also Ashis Nandy, 'Time Travel to a Possible Self: Searching for the Alternative Cosmopolitanism of Cochin', in Nandy, *Time Warps*, pp. 157-209; and 'A Report on the Present State of Health of the Gods and Goddesses in South Asia', Ibid., pp. 129-57.

[20] Following the criticisms of a number of friends, but primarily Gustavo Esteva, I have started using the term hospitality rather than tolerance, but only when talking of the idea or goal of interreligious amity. For I am also aware that competitive mass politics can at best ensure tolerance, not hospitality. Anthropologist Nur Yalman has recommended I use the expression *convivencia* to cover both the normative and the political. As we know, it was a term associated with Moorish Spain—arguably the only truly multi-ethnic, multi-religious polity Europe has produced during the last thousand years—and simultaneously invokes the concept of conviviality Ivan Illich uses. See for instance Maria Rosa Menocal, *The Ornament of the world: How Muslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* (Boston: Little Brown, 2002); and Ivan Illich, *Tools of Conviviality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). It is sometimes argued that the term *convivencia* is a retrospective coinage. I do not know why that should matter in the hot and dusty plains of India. It disconnects us as effectively as hospitality does from the baggage that the term secularism carries.

[21] For instance, Richard Falk, *Explorations at the Edge of Time: The Prospects for World Order* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), pp. 26-7.

Nazi Germany shows that the qualities that distinguished the rescuers, from the passive witnesses and the complicit, were strong religious beliefs, family and community ties—none of the three in short supply in South Asia—however archaic and unfashionable they might look to many.[22]

Some believe all this to be unnecessary. They insist that we affirm, even more aggressively, the ideology of secularism from our salons in metropolitan India, class-rooms and academic seminars, and through middle-class, urban movements. They expect their shrillness and stridency to clinch the issue. Strangely, even in these instances, to give teeth to their ideology, ideologues of secularism routinely fall back on Sufi and Bhakti poetry, medieval saints like Kabir, Lalan and Shah Latif, the Baul singers of Bengal and the Charans of Rajasthan, and names from history like Ashoka, Akbar, Dara Shikoh, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Narayan Guru, none of whom drew their principles or values from the ideology of secularism. There are three interrelated reasons for this strange contradiction—why, to propagate secularism, the secular Indians have to constantly invoke the nonsecular. First, the older icons of secularism like Jawaharlal Nehru have begun to rust and no longer wield their old charisma; many have been forced to search for new heroes who would make some sense to ordinary citizens. Second, secularism has become the last refuge of the intellectually lazy, of those who refuse to confront the logic of their own political and cultural choices. They are afraid to ask why they themselves have been forced to return to the past and to persons who consistently and openly used religion in public life to work for a more humane society.

The other side of the picture is that secularism, by itself, has proved to be a relatively sterile source of social creativity, at least in India. (This last reason is important. It explains why the secularists avoid like plague each other's writings when approaching or appealing to the common citizens and why such writings end up becoming the stuff of freestyle wrestling in academic arenas.) I have reluctantly concluded that if the secularists in south Asia themselves cannot produce a single secularist to exemplify the application of secularism in real life and have to depend

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[22] Eva Fogelman, 'Victims, Perpetrators, Bystanders and Recuers in the Face of Genocide and its Aftermath', in Charles B. Strozier and Michael Flynn(eds.), *Genocide, War and Human Survival* (New Yale: Rowman and Littlefield,), pp.87-98.

almost entirely on non-secular heroes who have never heard of secularism, I must take seriously these 'icons of secularism' and decipher the analytic frames they used and then build on them. By doing so, I believe that I have taken the secularists more seriously than they have done themselves.

In sum, here too I have done is what I have always done when analyzing largescale social pathologies. I have built on what creative, successful resistance against such pathologies has done and *said* it has done over the centuries, rather than on the ideological baggage secular fundamentalists have thrust on it. I am perfectly willing to revise my ideas in the matter and re-embrace secularism, but only when someone shows me that it can do better in the hot and dusty plains of India than the 'inferior' ideas of those who have successfully fought sectarianism in the past. By retrospectively and glibly calling their resistance to communalism secular we have not only shown contempt towards their theoretical apparatus—and towards their theology of tolerance—we have tried to distance these social activists and thinkers from ordinary Indians and brought them close to our world, to make them acceptable and respectable in our circles.

If we had not done so, we would have noticed that the resources these persons mobilized to become symbols of tolerance—and, I hasten to add, hospitality—are still available to large sections of South Asians. The high culture of democracy in modern, metropolitan India today has as its substratum a deep fear of the people and a vague, anxious suspicion that much of the citizenry might not need vanguards, experts in multiculturalism, or ideologically-driven, politically correct, Orwellian thought police. But saying so is an obviously an unpopular stance; it smacks of class-betrayal. How can there be a healthy, humane Indian polity where the concepts and categories that characterize the mainstream, global, middle-class culture become superfluous or secondary? Where shall we and our respectable friends in respectable universities then be?

Hence, the other prescription the spin doctors of secularism infrequently talk of but frequently end up recommending—greater use of the coercive apparatus of the state to ram the ideology of secularism down the throat of the Indian citizenry and to promote

an even more systematic use of the ideology as a principle of exclusion.[23] Naturally, they have to insist that any theory transparent to a majority of Indians and not fully transparent to India's westernised academe and middle-class journalists and to their North American and West European mentors, has to be rejected as a return to medieval times. If for that reason we have to declare secularism as the one human concept that is outside time and space, outside history and geography, we shall of course have to do so. In an open society, who am I to deny anyone the right to fight for secularism to the last Muslim, Christian or Sikh?

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[23] For instance, Sumanta Bannerji, 'Sangh Parivar and Democratic Rights', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 1993, 28(34), p. 1715-8.

Rajeev Barghava

'Multicultural', meaning the mere presence of many cultures has been around in India for several millennia. But multicultural*ism* is different: it is a special kind of relationship adopted by the state towards different cultural communities that fall within its sovereignty. In addition, it is also the official, doctrinal articulation of this stance, and, naturally, a term for theories of this doctrine, propounded and argued over, by academics and journalists.

Will Kymlicka tells us that 'multiculturalism' as a unique experiment started in Canada in 1971 followed by countries such as Australia. In a sense he is correct. As official doctrine and theory, it certainly began life in Canada, and later adopted in Australia, the US and Britain. But in another sense he is wrong. As official policy and broader normative orientation, its lineage is much older. It has been an integral feature of public debate in India for more than a century. There is hardly a multicultural policy known to the world that, in one form or another, has not been examined, used or discarded in India. To deepen our understanding of multiculturalism, to understand its internal tensions and fore see its problems, and accordingly to fine tune public policies, the world would do better if it looked, in the first place, to India.

The reason why, as a doctrine, multiculturalism appears to have originated where it did was twofold. Canada was an already multi-national state, with French speaking Quebec refusing to integrate on the US model. Yet, just like its American neighbour, it was also a country of immigration.

Unable to insist that newcomers accept a 'melting-pot' integration into a powerful US-style nationality, indeed fighting to avoid the break-up of the country itself, Canadian governments embraced a policy that recognized all its citizens could demand distinct kinds of identities. The unity of the country depended upon granting a constitutional right of difference to its own people within the framework of their nation-state. So the theory emerged in the West, which saw its experience as unique.

This might have remained a local experiment were it not for two factors. First, migration is now a permanent fact of life everywhere. Countries like Canada, the US and Australia, formed by immigration, understood it, in their bones as it were, as a permanent fact of life. Most other countries experienced it as an exception, an intrusion, a crisis in their composition. Today, however, as the arguments around 'People Flow' debates (such as that hosted by Demos and openDemocracy) have demonstrated, the immense imbalances of world population demographics and disparities of wealth, coupled with the technologies and transports of globalisation, are making mass immigration normal almost everywhere. One can simply say that the urbanization of humankind is now accelerating and as hundreds of millions move from the countryside the cities, many of these journeys will lead people to cross and settle beyond national borders, and it appears nothing can stop this.

Thus new minorities and diasporas, now intensely self-conscious and inter-connected thanks to information technology, are becoming part of the normal composition of almost all major societies. They are increasingly becoming like India.

Since 1950, the official, constitutional discourse of India has attended to the cultural rights of minorities, funding of minority educational institutions, cultural rights of indigenous peoples, linguistic rights, self-government rights of culturally distinct groups, asymmetrical federalism, legal pluralism, affirmative action for marginalized groups. You name it and India has it in its lengthy Constitution. Public holidays that bestow official recognition to minority religions, flexible dress codes, a sensitivity in history and literature to the cultures and traditions of minorities, government funding of specially significant religious practices, all have long been part of official state policy.

True, in most theoretical discussions on multiculturalism, India is rarely mentioned. But this is merely testimony to the narrowness and parochialism of the dominant public cultures of the West, which still assumes that it houses the future not the past.

Perhaps the most important lesson India has for the debate over and policies towards 'multiculturalism' is the need to re-think and reform another 'ism'- secularism. This term, originally non-Indian, is now part of the everyday vocabulary of Indian politics and society in a way that others could embrace.

The introduction of secularism into a discussion of multiculturalism will raise the eyebrows of only the very naïve. Secularism defines itself in relation to religion and always, everywhere, even when they are understood to be conceptually separate, cultures and religions remain deeply intertwined. This is even more so in cases where the very distinction between religion and culture is hard to draw. Is the hijab for a Muslim a cultural or a religious object? Is marriage among Muslims a cultural or a religious event? Is the identity of a Hindu or a Jew cultural or religious? To deal with multiculturalism, then, is to be confronted with the presence of multiple religions, indeed with the public, often conflictual presence of multiple religions – something that has been a constitutive feature of social reality on the subcontinent. Since secularism defines itself in relation to religion, it must also see itself in relation to multiple religions. This is primarily how the term secularism works on the subcontinent, when indeed it is allowed to do any work at all!

The multi-religious reality of the subcontinent should become the starting point for discussions of western secularism. For it is now evident that a central aspect of the classic, or western secularization thesis is deeply mistaken. The projected privatization of religion mandated by classic notions of modernization has failed to materialize even in western societies. Instead, for better or for worse, what is taking place is not only the continued public presence of religion but also what Casanova called the 'de-privatization' of religions which had earlier retreated from the public sphere. For example, the militant role of evangelical and born-again Christianity in the United States and the global impact of the policies of the Roman Catholic Church.

More important, migration from former colonies and an intensified globalization has thrown together on western soil pre-Christian faiths, Christianity and Islam. The public spaces of western societies are reclaimed not only by people of one religion and its various denominations but increasingly claimed by several other religions begetting a deep religious diversity the like of which they have not known before. As a result, the weak but distinct public monopoly of single religions has been challenged by the very norms that govern these societies.

Third, the encounter between these multiple religions is not exactly dialogic. Rather, it generates mutual suspicion, distrust, hostility and conflict. To some extent, this is a 'normal' reaction to a close encounter with the unfamiliar. It is due in part also to the different understandings of individual and social selves embodied in the divergent cumulative traditions of each of these religions. But there is also something troubling about the exclusions that mark the self-understanding of religions themselves, about their inability to form less damaging understandings of those who fall outside their fold. The bigotry on one side is matched on the other by a demonization that relentlessly supplies an excuse for denying the other's religion an equal space in public life. Like in so many other social phenomena, the causal arrows flow in both directions. For South Asians, there is a very familiar ring to this scenario.

One can put this another way. Different forms of dance or dress can have deep and abiding identity-significance yet be easily incorporated in the politics and privatisation of classical liberalism now re-shaped by the spectacle of the market and fashion. When, however, culture is organised by religion, it can be accompanied by lasting forms of exclusions, bans and power-systems (usually unaccountable rule by old men) as well as practices and procedures which limit freedom and have democratic consequences.

The question is: Is western secularism equipped to deal with the new reality of multiple religions in public life or with the social tensions this engenders? The dominant self-understanding of western secularism, which has become something like a formula, is that it is a *universal* doctrine requiring the strict separation of church and state (or religion and politics) for the sake of individual liberty and equality, including religious liberty and equality.

On this view, the context that gave it urgency and significance was the fundamental social problem of modernizing western societies, namely, the tyranny, oppression and sectarianism of the church and the threat it posed first to religious liberty conceived individualistically - the liberty of an individual to seek his own personal way to God, an individual's freedom of conscience, then to liberty more generally and eventually to the creation of common citizenship.

To secure this value, it was necessary to create or strengthen an alternative centre of public power completely separate from the church. The individualist underpinnings of this view are unmistakable. So is the rigidity of what it demands - nothing but mutual exclusion, a Wall, as Jefferson so famously put it, between the two relevant institutions, one that is intrinsically and solely public and the other that must retreat into the private domain and remain there.

This classic, western conception of secularism appeared to rest on an active hostility to the *public* role of religion and an obligatory, sometimes respectful indifference to whatever religion does within its own internal, *private* domain. As long as it is private, the state is not meant to interfere with it. Moreover, it was designed to solve an internal problem of a single religion with different heresies - Christianity.

It is now increasingly clear that this form of western secularism has persistent difficulties in seeking to cope with community-oriented religions that demand a public presence, particularly when they begin to multiply in society. This individualistic, inward looking secularism is already proving vulnerable and may plunge from crisis to crisis. The rigid response to the issue of Hijab by the republican state in France, the ambiguous, not so impartial response of the German state to the demand by Turkish Muslims for the public funding of their educational institutions, are harbingers of clashes to come.

So which way will these western societies go? Will they become even more dogmatic in their assertions about their strict-separation secularism? Or, in view of changed circumstances, abandon it to unashamedly embrace their majoritarian religious character, and return to the days of establishment, as we see signs of in the 'born-again' practices of the Bush administration? Or could they not work out a better form of secularism which addresses these new demands without giving up values for which the original was devised? More important, is it not worth asking if such an alternative exists already?

I think it does - a conception not available as a doctrine or a theory but worked out in the subcontinent and available loosely in the best moments of inter-communal practice in India, in its Constitution appropriately interpreted, and in the scattered writings of some of its best political actors.

A number of features stand out about the Indian model. First, multiple religions are not extras, added on as an after thought but present at its starting point, as part of its foundation. Second, it is not entirely averse to the public character of religions. Although the state is not identified with a particular religion or with religion more generally (there is no establishment of religion), there is official and therefore public recognition granted to religious communities. Third, its commitment to multiple values, not just liberty or equality conceived narrowly but interpreted broadly to cover the relative autonomy of religious communities and equality of status in society as well as other more basic values such as peace and toleration between communities. This model is acutely sensitive to the potential within religions to sanction violence.

For this and other reasons, it does not erect a wall of separation between state and religion, its fourth extremely important feature. There are boundaries, of course, but they are porous. This allows the state to intervene in religions, to help or hinder them - to grant aid to educational institutions of religious communities on a non-preferential basis, to interfere in socio-religious institutions that deny equal dignity and status to members of their own religion or to those of others (e.g. the ban on untouchability and the obligation to allow everyone, irrespective of their caste, to enter Hindu temples, and potentially to correct gender inequalities), and to do so without regard to whether such interference (help or hindrance) is crudely equal (same treatment in the same manner and to the same degree) but instead on the basis of a more sensible understanding of equal concern and respect for all individuals and groups. In short, it interprets separation to mean not strict exclusion or strict neutrality but rather what I have called principled distance.

Fifth, this model shows that we do not have to choose between active hostility or passive indifference or between disrespectful hostility or respectful indifference. We can have the necessary hostility as long as there is also active respect: the state may intervene to inhibit some practices, so long as it shows respect for the religious community and it does so by publicly lending support to it in some other way. Finally, by not fixing its commitment from the start exclusively to individual or community values or marking rigid boundaries between the public and private, India's constitutional secularism allows decisions on these matters to be taken within the open dynamics of democratic politics,

albeit with the basic constraints such as abnegation of violence and protection of basic human rights, including the right not to be disenfranchised.

This commitment to multiple values and principled distance means that the state tries to balance different, ambiguous but equally important values. This makes its secular ideal more like an ethically-sensitive, politically negotiated arrangement (which it really is), rather than a scientific doctrine conjured by ideologues and merely implemented by political agents.

A somewhat forced, formulaic articulation of Indian secularism goes something like this. The state must keep a principled distance from all public or private, individual-oriented or community-oriented religious institutions for the sake of the equally significant (and sometimes conflicting) values of peace, this-worldly goods, dignity, liberty and equality (in all its complicated individualistic or non-individualistic versions). Some readers may find in this condensed version an irritatingly complicated collage and yearn for the elegance, economy and tidiness of western secularism. But, alas, no workable constitution will generate the geometrical beauty of a social scientific theory or a chemical formula. The ambiguity and flexibility of the conception of secularism developed by India is not a weakness but in fact the strength of an inclusive and complex political ideal.

Discerning students of western secularism may now begin to find something familiar in this ideal. But then, Indian secularism has not dropped fully formed from the sky. It shares a history with the west. In part, it has learnt from and built on it. But is it not time to give something in return? What better way than to do this than by showing that Indian secularism is a route to retrieving the rich history of western secularism, forgotten, underemphasized, or frequently obscured by the formula of strict separation and by many of its current theoretical articulations! For the image of western secularism I outlined above is just one its variants, what can be called church-state model, Another equally interesting version that deepens the idea of western secularism flows from the religious wars in Europe and can be called the religious-strife model.

Yet, in its attempt to tackle the deep diversity of religious traditions, and in its ethically sensitive flexibility, there is something unparalleled in the Indian experiment - something

different from each of the two versions. If so, Western societies can find reflected in it not only a compressed version of their own history but also a vision of their future

But it might be objected: look at the state of the subcontinent! Look at India! How deeply divided it remains! How can success be claimed for the Indian version of secularism? I do not wish to underestimate the force of this objection. The secular ideal in India is in periodic crisis and is deeply contested. Besides, at the best of times, it generates as many problems as it solves.

But it should not be forgotten that a secular state was set up in India *despite* the massacre and displacement of millions of people on ethno-religious grounds. It has survived in a continuing context in which ethnic nationalism remains dominant throughout the world. As different religious cultures claim their place in societies across the world, it may be India's development of secularism which offers the most peaceful, freedom-sensitive and democratic way forward. At any rate, why should the fate of ideal conceptions with trans-cultural potential be decided purely on the basis of what happens to them in their place of origin?

Secularism in India and China

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This contribution looks at secularism as a set of ideological movements that aim at the reform or the destruction of religious institutions, beliefs, and practices. It argues that secularism in India and China is a product of the Imperial Encounter in the 19th century and that the post-colonial state inherits the imperial problematic. The issue of secularism in India and China is thus decidedly different from that in Western Europe, but their histories are tied in the story of imperialism. In that sense India and China are not only good to compare with, but are deeply implicated in the development of Western understandings of religion from the 19th century.

Religion and the Imperial Encounter

First the category of "religion" has to be invented in India and China to understand indigenous traditions. This in itself created a huge number of debates, including the debate about the religious character of Buddhism and Confucianism. Traditions, such as Hinduism, had to be transformed into recognizable religions with a "canon", a "belief system", and a set of ritual practices. Christian missionaries attacked these traditions, the colonial state in India regulated them as a neutral arbiter, and when missionaries were attacked in China the imperial forces defended them. Indian and Chinese intellectuals set out to define their religions and reform them according to Western, often Protestant models. I see this as a form of secularization.

Colonial state in India, Republic in China

The British colonial state in the second half of the 19th century began to regulate the temples, mosques and other institutions especially in the area of religious endowments and landed property. Practices like sati and hook-swinging were forbidden. Reformers tried to get hold of temple management, replacing the priestly caste in a number of cases by middle-class politicians, and enforcing certain important changes, such as the temple-

entry for untouchables (a major transformation of religious notions of hierarchy). In general, however, the colonial state tried to stay neutral, above religious disputes and strife. The post-colonial state, led by Congress, is an interventionist state that derives its legitimacy from the nation and has a much harder job to stay neutral and is called by opponents: a pseudo-secular state.

The Chinese Republic from 1911 is deeply engaged in regulating the five official religions and make them part of civil society while repressing violently traditions and institutions that are seen as superstitious and leading to the backwardness of Chinese society. Temples are destroyed by nationalist forces and Chinese secularism is fed by a strong anti-clericalism. In the post-war era the Communists deepen this attack on superstition while bringing official world religions entirely under Party control.

Science and Magic

In both India and China in the nineteenth century there is a strong sense of the backwardness of the indigenous traditions and the need to modernize under the aegis of Western science. In India this leads tot the adoption of western education for the elite, but also to a defense of the scientific nature and rationality of the indigenous traditions which have to be reformed. In China the adoption of Western science is even more radical than in India and leads to a kind of scientistic secularism among intellectuals that is sometimes connected to a secular Confucianism and sometimes to Communism. In both India and China popular religion with its magic and superstition is the enemy that has to be attacked in order to make progress possible.

Chinese Communism and Indian Socialism

From the 1950s till the 1980s the communist Party has relentlessly persecuted local religious communities. The last installment of this were the witchhunts of the great Cultural revolution. An important aspect of this was an attempt to destroy feudal society with its religious land holdings and hierarchies. The communist party is a good example of millenarian secularism that mobilizes people for anti-religious campaigns.

None of this we find in India where first Gandhi connected modern nationalism to indigenous traditions and secondly Nehru chose a socialism that was connected to Indian civilization. There is no sense that Indian religions had to be destroyed to be able to make progress and one of the most radical opponents of Hinduism and the caste system, Ambedkar, in the end did not choose secularism but conversion to Buddhism as an answer to the problems of untouchables in India.

Nationalization of body and spirit

One of the contradictions of adopting science as the basis of national progress is the discovery of "another" science in one's own traditions. This we find both in India and China. In India both yoga and ayurveda are found to be indigenous science and connected to the spirituality of the nation. In China qi gong and the related taiji are found to be good for health and an alternative to expensive Western medicine. They are all seen as completely scientific and different from Western science and can thus be called nationalist science. In India these traditions are easily seen as part of national heritage and not as a threat to state control, while in China with its long history of state distrust of religious movements the moment these movements escape from control strong repression occurs, as in the case of the Falun Gong.

Religious Minorities in India and China

One of the things the secular state has to do is to protect religious minorities. Both in India when a Hindu nationalist government was in place and in China this is not guaranteed. The Hindu nationalists did not protect Muslims and Christians and the Chinese communists are persecuting ethno-religious minorities like the Uighur in Xinjiang (a problem that resembles that of Kashmir in India). Secularism as an ideology does not seem to have an answer to identity movements that are based on a mixture of ethnicity and religion.